Authoritarian Hawks: Authoritarianism as Microfoundations for Hawkish Foreign Policy Preferences in China

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Abstract

Who are the foreign policy hawks in China? Existing literature focuses on nationalism as an explanation for popular hawkishness. However, recent empirical examination of survey data has challenged the notion of rising nationalism as a source of Chinese hawkishness. Drawing on political psychology literature, I seek to explain the hawkish preferences of ordinary Chinese citizens as the consequence of a popular illiberal authoritarian ideology, rather than nationalism. International relations (IR) researchers have paid more attention to authoritarian regimes. Yet, there is scant literature examining the political manifestations of individual authoritarian dispositions in the foreign policy domain. Hence, this paper is an attempt to bridge the authoritarian personality literature and the IR study of hawkishness. Using data generated by a large-scale opt-in survey as well as an original causal mediation experiment fielded in China, I argue that individual foreign policy hawkishness is a result of the externalization of authoritarianism political values, particularly collectivism and punitiveness.

Keywords

Authoritarianism, political psychology, autocracy, China, hawkishness, survey experiment, public opinion, nationalism, methodology, international security

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Introduction

How do political ideologies shape foreign policy preferences? What kind of ideologies shape individual support for the use of military force? The conventional wisdom is that nationalism, a sense of attachment to one’s nation, boosts support for war. As Rupert Emerson (1960, 384) puts it, “the price of nationality is war”. Following this conventional wisdom, hawkishness of Chinese citizen is often attributed to rising nationalism observed in successive waves of emotional nationwide protests against the United States and Japan. However, few international relations researchers have tested empirically whether nationalism actually constitutes the microfoundations of hawkish foreign policy preference.  

Still fewer have tested alternative ideological and psychological sources of individual hawkishness in China. In this paper, I argue that an authoritarianism constitutes an alternative microfoundations for hawkish foreign policy preference.

Unlike nationalism, authoritarianism, as authoritarian political ideology is not centered on one’s identification with a particularly national community, its culture, or language. Rather, authoritarianism captures the individual attitudes towards the scope of state power and limitation in individual freedom. In line with works by Converse (1964, 3) and Gerring’s (1997, 980), I adopt their definition of ideology as “a configuration of ideas and attitudes in which the elements are bound together by some form of constraint or functional interdependence.” Motivationally, political ideology can be defined as an interrelated set of attitudes and values about the proper goals of society and how they should be achieved (Tedin 1987, 65). Ideology is also a stable set of political ideas that stands in contrast to competing sets of ideas such as left versus right, communism versus fascism (Gerring 1997, 980; Converse 2006). In a way, individuals’ ideological identification is a self-sorting process through which people with shared psychological dispositions cluster. Ideology is the underlying value orientation and predisposition that serves as an antecedent for individual attitudes on political issues, including foreign policy issues (Huddy, Sears, and Levy 2013, 247). Post-war survey data in the United States reveals that political ideology is a strong predictor of individual foreign policy preferences (Holsti 2004, 192). For example, Binning (2007) finds that political conservatives score lower on generalized trust, higher on competitiveness, and as a result, have more hawkish foreign policy preferences. As noted by Rathbun (2012, 46), when it comes to concepts central to the study of international relations such as trust and conflict, there are marked parallels between the literature on social orientation on the one hand, and the psychological literature on political ideology on the other.

In particular, recent research reveals the linkage between different personal political beliefs and hawkish preference. Hawkishness is a foreign policy preference for the use of military force. Generally, hawks believe security is achieved through the demonstration of strength (Jervis 1976). Consequently, hawks are more willing to use military force. Doves,

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2 Drawing on Kertzer (Herrmann, Tetlock, and Visser 1999; Kahneman and Renshon 2009a), I define microfoundations are micro-level dynamics, such as individual beliefs, that have implications for the aggregate level questions.
viewing international relations as cooperative, seek common ground and avoid the use of military force (Russett 1988, 516).

Several studies show that individuals political beliefs have significant implications for theirs support for the use of military force. For example, ideologies of democracy and human rights are important factors lowering public support for the use of military force (Maoz and Russett 1993; Tomz and Weeks 2013; Onderco and Wagner 2017). Kertzer, Powers, Rathbun, and Iyer’s (2014, 833) study of American hawkishness showed that those who highly the moral principles of value in-group loyalty, and moral purity are likely to subscribe to hawkish foreign policies. Ideologies are also shown to have cognitive implications pertinent to hawkishness. One of the findings of Tetlock’s (2005, 78, 118, 153) prediction tournament experiment is that experts with strong ideological commitment tend to overuse heuristic-driven reasoning, overestimating threats, and underestimating possible pathway to cooperation. In addition, neuroscience research reaches the same conclusion regarding the connection between certain ideologies and different levels of threat perception. Eye-tracking experiments reveals that conservative subjects are more sensitive to threatening visual stimuli and negative information (Dodd, Hibbing, and Smith 2011; Mills et al. 2016).

Case Selection

I chose China as my case study because it is one of the few contemporary cases in which a popular authoritarian ideology exists in a powerful authoritarian state. Most existing studies of authoritarian disposition have been conducted in Western democracies such as the United States, where, until recently, few political parties or candidates announce overtly authoritarian political agenda, making the study of the political implication of authoritarianism more difficult and circumscribed (Cohen and Smith 2016). The China case provides a unique opportunity to examine the effect of explicitly authoritarian ideology on individuals’ foreign policy preferences in an authoritarian state. Since the theoretical argument and assumption about nationalism-hawkishness linkage is not particular to China (Van Evera 1994; Mansfield and Snyder. 1995; Mearsheimer 2001; Schrock-Jacobson 2012), contesting the validity of nationalism as a microfoundation of hawkishness would also contribute to the wide debate over the role of nationalism in international relations. Differentiating the foreign policy preferences of individual Chinese citizens help shed light on the microfoundation of a series of theoretical and empirical puzzles, such as how audience cost works in the authoritarian state, and how authoritarians react to deterrence.

Given that China is among a handful of existent cases that face geopolitical contingencies in which major power war may realistically materialize, it is also of substantive importance to examine public foreign policy preferences in China, a rising economic and military power and potential competitor of the United States, including how individual citizens think about security policy at the microlevel. In addition, there is also an increasing number of survey-based studies of Chinese public preferences on issues of nationalism and foreign policy which proves the methodological viability of studying public opinion in a authoritarian state (Manion 2010; Dickson 2016; J. Chen and Dickson 2008; Zhang 2013).
Structure

This paper utilizes the political psychology literature’s study of authoritarian dispositions – submission, conventionalism, and punitive aggression – to bring authoritarian ideology into the studies of international relations. The paper challenges the conventional wisdom that nationalism is the primary source of Chinese hawkishness. Using an analysis of a 2014 large-scale survey, and an original survey experiment, it seeks to highlight the influence of authoritarian political ideology on ordinary Chinese citizens’ foreign policy hawkishness. My two empirical studies reveal not only that nationalism’s association with hawkishness has been overestimated but also that authoritarian ideology, which encompasses collectivist and punitive beliefs, is associated with a significantly higher level of individual support for the use of military force and cost tolerance.

This paper is structured as follows: in the first section (I), I review the existing literature, which centers around nationalism as an explanation of hawkish foreign policy preferences among Chinese citizens. Drawing on the political psychology research, section (II) present authoritarianism as a alternative explanation for hawkishness. Section (III) lays out my two empirical studies including a regression analysis of the 2014 Chinese Political Compass Survey (CPCS) data as well as my own experiment that uses a national security threat treatment to illicit hawkish reactions. The last section (IV) tests and discusses two causal mechanisms linking authoritarianism and hawkish foreign policy preferences as well as their implications.

I. Existing Explanation for Chinese Hawkishness: Chinese Nationalism

The definition of nationalism is one of the major debates in political science and sociology. Due to scope limits, this paper cannot and does not intend to do full justice to the wider conceptual debate on nationalism. Rather, I will use existing literature on contemporary Chinese nationalism as a departure point. There are three broad schools of thoughts on nationalism. First, the functionalist approach sees nationalism as a functional necessity of modernizing society maintaining social cohesion and stability during the social upheaval of industrialization (Gellner 1983). The second school argues that nationalism is an modern enhancement of premodern ethnic, linguistic and historical identities (A. D. Smith 1991). And the third constructivist school characterizes nationalism as a consequence of an elite construct (Anderson 1983; Brass 1991).

Literature on Chinese nationalism and its role on foreign policy reflect a combination of premodern and constructivist schools. While Zhao (2004), Callahan (2004; 2015) and Wang (2012) emphasizes Chinese nationalism as an elite construct based on the patriotic education and the history of national humiliation, Gries (2004), Chen-Wiess (2014a), and Reilly (2012) acknowledge some of the organic grassroots basis of popular nationalism. The definition of nationalism in this paper synthesizes the common denominator of Gries’(2004, 9; Gries et al. 2011, 9) Johnston’s (2017, 13) and Dickson’s (2016, 204) conception of Chinese nationalism as attachment to the nation, linking self-image to the being and member of the national community. Such a definition of nationalism as rooted in national attachment is also largely in line with the conception of nationalism by political psychologists (Herrmann, Isernia, and Segatti 2009, 745;
Spinner-Halev and Theiss-Morse 2003, 519; Herrmann 2017). Motivationally, nationalism entails individual support policy that advances the interests and prestige of the national community. For example, the economic aspect of nationalism would be in favor of discriminatory economic policies in favor of one’s own nation such as tariffs on foreign goods (Macesich 1985).

Much of the literature examining the hawkishness of the Chinese public has focused exclusively on the role of nationalism (Weiss 2014a; Callahan 2015; Gries, Steiger, and Wang 2016; Ross 2009). According to this explanation, nationalism is associated with hawkish foreign policy preferences, including suspicion of the United States, or support for the use of force to settle territorial disputes (Zhao 2013, 544–49). For example, Fravel (2010, 518) argued that popular Chinese nationalism is the domestic source of a variety of expansionist policies, ranging from territorial irredentism to diversionary war. Moreover, Hughes (2011, 604) identified “geopolitik nationalism” in the popular political writings of leading hawkish opinion leaders, which exhibit many themes similar to those in pre-War Germany and Japan, such as emphasis on lebensraum and survival. Ross (2010, 72) asserts that naval nationalism, instead of security concern, is the driving force behind China’s naval ambition. Furthermore, Wallace and Weiss (2015; 2014b) and Reilly (2014; 2012) explained the way in which the hawkish preferences of Chinese nationalists translates into state foreign policy through protests. Mearsheimer (2001, 400) pointed to Chinese “chauvinism” and “hyper-nationalism” as potent sources of Sino-US conflict. Echoing Kennan’s long telegram, Friedberg (2015, 138) went so far as to claim that nationalism is a key “source of Chinese conduct” that has impelled Beijing to take a hardline position in international disputes. It seems that for every question in China’s foreign policy, there is a nationalist answer to it.

On the other hand, critics of such a nationalist explanation contest the empirical claim that nationalism is on the rise (Yu and Zhao 2006; Carlson 2009; Johnston 2017). They assert either that there is no rise of nationalism in China, or that the Chinese regime is unresponsive to nationalist opinion. For example, drawing on social identity theory, Greis (2005, 245) argues that nationalism is an necessary but insufficient condition for Sino-US conflict. Moreover, Johnston’s (2017, 20) analysis of Beijing Area Study (BAS) survey data between 1998 and 2015 revealed that nationalism, measured as national pride was relatively stable during the period; and nationalist sentiment among young Chinese has actually declined in recent years.

However, critics of the nationalist explanation have neither questioned whether nationalism is the primary ideational source of hawkishness, nor explored alternative ideational or psychological variables that could be associated with hawkish preferences. Moreover, both sides of the debate have failed to investigate the role of authoritarian political ideology as an ideational factor shaping hawkishness.

II. Alternative Theory of Hawkishness: Authoritarian Ideology

Taking a behavioral approach, the present research introduces authoritarian ideology as an explanatory variable for individual hawkishness. In the following section, I provide a qualitative
conceptual justification and a quantitative empirical justification for why authoritarianism is chosen as my independent variable and how authoritarianism is different from nationalism.

As a political ideology, authoritarianism captures the individual attitudes towards the scope of state power and limitation in individual freedom. The political science study of authoritarianism can be traced back to Adorno et al.’s (1950) *Authoritarian Personality* which was the seminal work on the subject. In the book, they argue that certain personality traits that make an individual susceptible to fascistic authoritarian government as opposed to a “democratic personality” that values progressive liberal democracy. The original authoritarian personality theory was criticized for its Freudian, tautological reasoning, as well as a lack of robust empirical evidence (Christie and Jahoda 1954; Hyman and Sheatsley 1954; Martin 2001; Feldman and Stenner 1997). Altemeyer’s (1988; 2003) Right-Wing-Authoritarian (RWA) scale and his experimental investigations revitalized the study of authoritarianism. Current research on authoritarianism expands beyond the measurement of authoritarian-tendency and increasingly focuses on authoritarianism as an explanatory variable in a wide-range of political science and psychological subjects, ranging from public perception of terrorist threat, the role of authoritarianism in fostering in-group cooperation, to the influence of authoritarianism on individual adoption of international relations paradigms (Perrin 2005; Liberman 2007; Kessler and Cohrs 2008; Kertzer and Mecgraw 2012).

**Core authoritarian triad**

In this paper, I uses the core authoritarian triad, instead of Adorno’s flawed F-scale which conflates authoritarian political belief with conservatism, and ethnocentrism (Martin 2001, 6, 11), as the basis my conceptualization and measurement. The core authoritarian triad has three components: (a) Submission — support and obedience of authority, (b) Conventionalism — adherence to existing norms, and (c) Punitive aggression — preference for aggressive punitive forceful measures against perceived threats to and enemies of authority or society (Altemeyer 1981; Altemeyer 1988; Altemeyer 1996).

Seen in this light, the authoritarianism ideology in contemporary China, which consists of individual opposition to multiparty democracy, rejection of freedom of speech, and prioritization of social stability over individual freedom, is a manifestation of authoritarian predisposition in political attitudes. The third wave of Asia Barometer Survey suggests rejection of certain key characteristics of liberal democracy is not an unusual position among Chinese respondents. For instance, a plurality (45 percent) of respondent prefer government censorship of contents that could be politically destabilizing (versus 38.1 percent prefers free press), and a majority (63.6 percent) prefer “One party represents the interests of all the people” over multiparty competition (Wu, Chang, and Pan 2017, 354). Public support for authoritarian regime measured by trust and confidence in the government is reflected in several different nationally.

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3 Adorno et al used a F-scale to measure authoritarian personality and predisposition to fascist beliefs.
representative surveys including the World Value Surveys, Pew Global Attitude Surveys, as well as the Chicago Council on Global Affairs survey of global attitudes.⁴

Most research on authoritarian personality has been conducted in the United States and Europe. As a result, one common critic of authoritarianism’s measurement is that it was designed for individualistic western cultures. Comparatively, individuals from more collectivist Asian cultures would score higher on authoritarianism scale. I acknowledge that cultural difference might present a methodological challenge if a single questionnaire is used to measure individuals across distinct cultures and nations. However, the present paper compares individuals with varying degrees of authoritarianism within the same society — China rather than doing a cross-cultural comparison thus avoiding the problem of ethnolinguistic and cultural differences. In addition, despite its varying degrees and assorted manifestations, the core of authoritarianism is not peculiar to any particular society or era (Stenner 2005; Greenstein 2014; Duckitt 1989; Altemeyer 1996).

**Distinguishing Authoritarianism from Nationalism**

One reason why authoritarian ideology has been overlooked as an explanatory variable is that some international relations researchers, including those who employ survey measures, tend to use an excessively broad measurement of nationalism which includes not only one’s identification with and attachment to the nation, but also individual citizens’ political support for the authoritarian regime in China. For instance, Johnston (2017, 14) measures nationalism using survey question assessing “support for social, political and economic status quo”, which is unduly broad. The broad measurement of Chinese nationalism in the existing literature not only exceeded the commonly accepted definition of nationalism, conflation of nationalism and political authoritarianism, might have also led to the overestimation of nationalism’s explanatory power. Therefore, in order to examine ideational source of Chinese hawkishness, it is important to distinguish between authoritarianism and nationalism.

**Figure 1 Conceptualization of Nationalism, Liberalism, and Authoritarianism**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationalism</th>
<th>Liberalism</th>
<th>Authoritarianism⁵</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Pride</td>
<td>Support for: Liberal democracy, human rights, information freedom, religious freedom, and legal due process</td>
<td>Support for: Authoritarian regime, limitations on human rights, information freedom, religious freedom, and legal due process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attachment to the Nation</td>
<td>Prioritize:</td>
<td>Prioritize:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support measure to advance the interests and image of the national community</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


⁵ See Appendix for a linkage between political authoritarianism the core authoritarian triad.
Freedom over order and security  
Individual interest over interests of the society.  

Order and security over freedom  
Societal interests over individual interests

Nationalism and authoritarianism are substantively different belief systems. Though an authoritarian could also be a nationalist, there are also liberal nationalists who support democratic principles, human rights, but at the same time, strongly identify with one’s national community. There is an abundance of historical examples: French nationalism since the 1789 revolution encompasses both nationalistic and liberal beliefs. Greek nationalists seeking independence from the Ottoman Empire also held politically liberal beliefs. In the aftermath of the First World War, many nationalist movements across Europe and Asia seeking self-determination shared liberal political ideology. There are many different possible combinations among liberalism, authoritarianism, and nationalism which have resulted in a literature debating how to differentiate civic nationalism from ethno-nationalism (Connor 1973; Plamenatz 1973; Ignatieff 1995). Furthermore, as Morgenthau (1967, 323) points out, liberalism, nationalism, communism, and national socialism were fused in different ways by different regimes to justify their foreign and domestic agendas, and nationalism, one’s attachment to the national community could be liberal and pacific (Herrmann, Isernia, and Segatti 2009, 722; Huntington 2004, 264).

Political authoritarianism is conceptually distinct from nationalism. Although Adorno et al., in their flawed F-test, sought to lump the two together, a balanced F-test does not yield support for the linkage of authoritarianism and ethnocentrism (Ray 1972, 11). And even in those cases when authoritarianism coincides with ethnocentrism, such an ethnocentric attitude is a by-product of one’s relations with authority, such as state-sanctioned ethnic prejudice rather than ethnocentrism per se. The connection between authoritarian and ethnocentric measurement is largely due to the problematic conflation of conservatism and authoritarianism in the F-test and RWA measurements which problematically conflates right-wing conservative ideology with authoritarianism into a single independent variable (Rokeach 1960; Oesterreich 2005; Radkiewicz 2016). For example, Radkiewicz (2016) finds that after adjusting for right-wing conservative ideology, authoritarianism has little statistical association with ethnocentric, nationalist attitudes. Hence, authoritarianism and nationalism are substantively different and should not be conflated.
There is also an empirical justification for distinguishing authoritarianism and nationalism in the present study; the principal component analysis (PCA) in Figure 2 illustrates how different ideologies related to and different from each other in the 2014 Chinese Political Compass Survey (CPCS) respondents. The angles between vectors indicate the difference between ideologies. Two similar ideologies would have vectors that are parallel (0 degrees). On the contrary, ideologies that have vectors pointing at opposite directions (180 degrees) are strongly and negatively related to each other. A perpendicular relation (90 degrees) indicates two ideologies are not closely related to each other. For instance, the authoritarianism vector is opposite of the liberalism vector, indicating that liberalism and authoritarianism are opposing belief systems; Liberal respondents are very unlikely to hold authoritarian beliefs. Nationalism and authoritarianism vectors are not parallel, which suggests that though there are many respondents who hold both nationalist and authoritarian views, there are substantive differences between authoritarian ideology and nationalism. Moreover, by adjusting for nationalism in my regression model, I can address the potential overlap between authoritarianism and ethnocentric nationalism. The difference between nationalism and authoritarianism became even more clear when the variables are standardized. In a nutshell, the PCA shows that China’s ideological landscape is quite unlike that in a democracy with multi-party competition, such as the United States, where different ideological positions and issue preferences cluster and bi-polarize due to mobilization of political party and coalitions. For example, Republicans in the US are predictably socially conservative, foreign policy hawks, nationalist, and pro-free market. Without competitive party mobilization, issue preference and ideological polemic in a single party authoritarian state are more multidimensional and loosely connected.

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6 The method section and empirical study 1 provides a more detail description of the 2014 Chinese Political Compass survey.
7 In a more polarized society, different ideological vectors in a PCA biplot would tend to be near parallel to or oppose to one another along a left right axis.
Hypotheses

Hypothesis 1: Authoritarianism is positively correlated with hawkishness

Hypothesis 2: Authoritarianism has a more significant role in shaping individual hawkishness than nationalism.

Hypothesis 3: Authoritarianism is positively associated with hawkishness because authoritarians are more collectivist and willing to pay personal cost for achieving collective objectives.

Hypothesis 4: Authoritarianism is positively associated with hawkishness because authoritarians are more punitive and willing to take forceful action against an adversary.

Figure 3: Hypotheses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variable</th>
<th>Mechanisms</th>
<th>Dependent Variable</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Authoritarianism</td>
<td>Punitiveness</td>
<td>Hawkishness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collectivism</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</table>

The purpose of this study is two-fold: (1) Using data generated by a 2014 large scale survey in China, I will test empirically Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2 the correlation between individuals’ ideological leanings and their foreign policy hawkishness; (2) Combining empirical results from the analysis of survey with an causal mediation experiment, I will explore how authoritarianism leads to greater hawkishness which shed light on the two hypothesized causal pathways: collectivism — Hypothesis 3, and punitiveness — Hypothesis 4.

How might authoritarianism affect individual support for the use of military force? I anticipate the collectivist and punitive tendencies of authoritarianism to be projected onto foreign policy reasoning. Specifically, I expect two casual mechanisms to link authoritarianism with support for the use of military force. On the one hand, the collectivist tendency of the authoritarians makes them more cost tolerant when facing a high cost conflict situation. On the other hand, just as authoritarians are more willing to punish domestic criminals and threats, the punitive tendency of authoritarians makes them more willing to punish an external adversary. Moreover, I anticipate the dispositional variable – authoritarianism will interact with rationalist calculation processes – particularly the levels of cost tolerance.

Scope Limit:

Because of its limited scope, this paper will focus only on the authoritarian microfoundations of individual foreign policy preferences. It will not seek to test the way in which individual preferences aggregate into state-level foreign policy outcomes. Further, this research will not attempt to explain what kinds of people are more likely to accept an
authoritarian ideology. Rather, respondents of the surveys self-identify their authoritarian leanings. It is also worth noting that the psychological approach is an addition rather than substitution of rationalist or constructivist theories. To claim authoritarianism explains all foreign policy attitudes would overstate dispositional factors and underweighting situational factors. Indeed, there is nothing innate to rationalism that precludes it from considering different sets of micro-level assumptions many of which form the microfoundations of rationalist theories (Kertzer 2016, 82).

III. Research Design and Methodology: Survey and Experiment

There are five broad methodological approaches commonly used to measure individual ideological beliefs: experiment, survey, content analysis, discourse analysis, and observer evaluation (McDermott 2004, 21–38; Sylvan and Metskas 2009, 93). Each approach involves tradeoffs. The present paper employs survey and experiment approaches by (1) utilizing data generated by a large-scale survey and (2) an original experiment. The large-scale survey data allows me to study the opinions of a large number of Chinese citizens, which provides correlational evidence. The experiment, on the other hand, gives me the opportunity to build upon the correlational evidence and explore the causal mechanisms.

In the first empirical analysis of this thesis, I use the data generated by the Chinese Political Compass Survey (CPCS), which includes questions that can tap into different components of political authoritarianism, nationalism, and foreign policy hawkishness. In this study, I will use the 2014 survey results, encompassing over 170,000 respondents. Each respondent responded to 50 statements ordered randomly (see Appendix) that cover a variety of issues, including political ideologies, foreign policy preferences, and attitudes on economic policy, and on social issues. Responses were recorded on a Likert Scale that ranges from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”. No neutral option is provided. Based on raw survey results in natural language, I coded each of these responses numerically between -2 and 2, in which the value -2 represents “strongly disagree”, while the value 2 denotes “strongly agree.” Although it does not constitute a random sample, the self-selection characteristics of the survey are a desirable feature in the study of ideology and issue preferences. It allows intrinsically motivated respondents to self-report their ideological leanings and avoids social desirability bias. With respect to studies of ideological beliefs, and moral principles, large scale, opt-in surveys could produce more reliable estimates than random, but small surveys (Pan and Xu 2016, 9; Chang and Krosnick. 2009; Seth J. Hill et al. 2007).

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9 Survey data and my coding are available at https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataverse/xunchaozhang
Dependent Variable (DV): Hawkishness

In this paper, I adopt the definition of hawkishness as a higher support for the use of military force (Herrmann, Tetlock, and Visser 1999; Kahneman and Renshon 2009a). Support for the use of military force is measured by responses to the following survey questions.10

- “If conditions permit, China should use force to achieve unification with Taiwan.”

In addition, given that threat inflation and suspicion are also seen by some researchers as an important source of hawkishness (Kaufmann 2004; Kahneman and Renshon 2009a), a question measuring individual suspicion of foreign powers is also included.

- “It is impossible for Western countries led by the United States to permit the rise of China as a first-class major power.”

The first question assesses respondents’ willingness to accept the use of force as a foreign policy instrument. Because a Chinese attempt to take Taiwan by force would entail a major and costly conflict, and possibly involve a confrontation with the United States, agreement with this statement provides a strong indication of a person’s preference for the use of military force. The second question measures individuals’ suspicion of foreign powers. Positive responses to the second statement indicate a higher level of suspicion. Conversely, answering “disagree” or “strongly disagree” reflects a lack of hawkishness. It is worth clarifying that, here, suspicion does not entail a respondent believes that the United States would act in ways that are inconsistent with its rhetoric. Rather, suspicion refers to a threat perception — the perceived level of U.S. hostile intentions towards China. On both accounts, the Chinese state propaganda consistently emphasizes peaceful coexistence with the U.S., and peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue. Hence, cue-taking alone cannot explain individual levels of hawkishness on these two issues or heterogeneity of individual attitudes. Moreover, the two dimensions of hawkishness reflect different kinds of psychological “bias”. The suspicion dimension reflects the cognitive process of how individual process information and form threat perceptions. The willingness to use force, however, is more reflective of the individual’s motivated reasoning.

Operationalization of Independent Variables (IVs)11

Independent Variable 1: Authoritarianism:

Political ideology is an individual’s commitment to particular political institutions. In this case, Contemporary China’s ideological polemic includes three main cleavages: (1) political debate between liberals who support Western-style liberal democracy, human rights, and authoritarians who support the authoritarian rule and a single party meritocracy (Pan and Xu 2015); (2) economic debate between supporters of free market and the left that favors state intervention in the economy (H. Wang 1998; Wei 2011; Li 2009); and (3) cultural debate between social conservatives who advocate a revival of Confucian family values and social liberals who embrace social change (Fang 1997). Although individual’s economic and cultural

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10 See appendix for coding and full questionnaire of the Chinese Political Compass Survey dataset.
11 For the entire Chinese Political Compass Questionnaire in English and Chinese see Appendix.
views are undoubtedly important in the formation of foreign policy preferences (Moravcsik 1997, 527), because of scope limit and the existence of a rich literature on liberal ideology, this thesis will focus only on investigating the relationship between individuals’ authoritarian political ideological leaning and their foreign policy hawkishness.

My primary independent variable is individual-level authoritarianism. I will measure political authoritarianism with an authoritarian index based on twelve survey questions that assess respondents’ liberal and authoritarian leanings — a balanced composite index methodologically similar to the polity score. Specifically, respondents are required to respond to six affirmative statements about liberal beliefs, and six affirmative statements about authoritarian beliefs. A respondent who tends more towards authoritarianism scores higher on the index, while a respondent with liberal tendencies scores lower.

For authoritarians, freedom of speech, and political pluralism threaten the cohesion of a society which in turn, result in rebellion and instability (Feldman 2003, 68). Authoritarianism encompasses a wide range of illiberal beliefs, but for the purpose of my study, authoritarianism is the negative pole of liberalism (Linz 1964, 255; Jost et al. 2003, 341; Duckitt 1989, 64). Hence, I will define authoritarian ideology as opposition to a number of characteristics of liberal democracy, including multiparty democracy, suffrage, information freedom, and the precedence of individual interests over societal interests. Authoritarianism also encompasses a form of collectivism that prioritize societal interests over the interest of individual citizens. Authoritarians prioritize order and security over freedom (Feldman and Stenner 1997, 749).

Hence, an individual’s authoritarian score is the sum of a respondent’s responses to six statements affirming authoritarian beliefs. The following are three examples of statements supporting authoritarianism that can are used to measure authoritarian leaning:

- “People should not enjoy universal suffrage if they have not been educated about democracy.”
- “Western multiparty systems are unsuitable for China.”
- “Adoption of Western-style freedom of speech will lead to social disorder in China.”

In addition, respondents react to six statements affirming liberalism that are used as reverse-coded questions on authoritarianism. In this case, I adopt a classical definition of liberalism that entails an individual’s support for human rights, freedom of information, religious freedom, and legal due process (Mill 1869, 160, 177; Rawls 1993, 672; Barry 1987, 124; Feinberg 1990, 321). Overall, liberalism is based on individualist ideas favoring the placement of limitation on the power of organized authority over individual (Herz 1950, 159). A respondent’s liberal score is the sum of his/her responses to those six statements. The following are three examples of survey questions that are used to measure liberal tendencies:

- “Human rights take precedence over sovereignty.”
- “When events have major repercussions for public safety and security, the government should still allow free dissemination of information, even if such information disclosure increases the risks of unrest.”
• “Attorneys should do their utmost to defend a client even if the client did commit a crime.”

The numerical value of a respondent’s overall authoritarian index score is derived by subtracting the sum of his/her liberalism score from the score on authoritarianism; this procedure provides a single ordinal authoritarian index that ranges from -24 (most liberal) to 24 (most authoritarian). The index includes both question on liberalism and authoritarianism to create a balanced scale that reduced wording effect.\textsuperscript{12} To minimalize endogeneity, none of the authoritarianism measurements are related to foreign policy issues.

Although this political measurement is different from the traditional RWA scale or child-rearing measurement, the survey questions fit neatly into the core triad of authoritarianism: (1) obedience to authority, (2) reverence to conventional norm, and (3) punitive aggression towards threat to authority and norms.\textsuperscript{13} Moreover, given the prevalence of a more authoritarian parenting style in China, child-rearing measurements may not capture individual difference in authoritarianism (X. Chen, Dong, and Zhou 1997). It has been noted from the earliest authoritarian personality literature that anti-democratic, political authoritarian attitudes are strongly related to dispositional measures of authoritarianism (Adorno et al. 1950; Altemeyer 1988; Altemeyer 1996; Duckitt 1989; Jost et al. 2003; Perrin 2005; Federico, Fisher, and Deason 2011). Due to the fundamental conflict between punitive aggression and individual human rights, authoritarian ideology stands in opposition to liberal ideology. For instance, authoritarians support torture while caring less about human rights even in democratic societies (Hetherington 2011, 552). Moreover, given that authoritarian government is the established authority in China, liberal democratic value poses a threat to the established authority. Both dispositional characteristics and social context suggests that authoritarian ideology in China is oppositional to liberalism or democracy. Recent surveys of pro-democracy student activists in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, voters in Hungary, and Putin supporters in Russia reveal that anti-authoritarianism and authoritarianism also map onto fundamental personality dispositions (Cantoni David Yang Noam Yuchtman Y Jane Zhang et al. 2017, 21; Todosijević and Enyedi 2008, 779; Greene and Robertson 2017, 19).

\textbf{Independent Variable 2: Nationalism}

I will include nationalism as my second independent variable to test and adjust for its effect on individual citizens’ foreign policy hawkishness. I will use the two following questions to measure the level of nationalist leaning:

• “The state should take measures to train and support athletes, so they can win glory for the nation in various international competitions.”
• “A high tariff should be imposed on imported goods that are also produced domestically to protect national industries.”

\textsuperscript{12} If only one-way wording was used, acquiescent or agreeable respondents would score systematically higher.
\textsuperscript{13} See Appendix
A key challenge to study the relationship between nationalism and hawkishness using survey data is potential endogeneity. For example, if respondents’ nationalistic leaning were measured using direct questions such as whether they support China’s historical territorial claim in the South China Sea, or the Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan, such measurement would capture both the independent variable of nationalism and the dependent variable of hawkishness.

Hence, I use two indirect questions to obtain an approximate measure of nationalism that is not related directly to foreign policy issues, minimizing potential endogeneity. Specifically, the first question measures respondent’s national attachment – how much they value the honor and prestige of China as a nation. And the second question assesses economic nationalism.

Additional Variables and Controls: The survey asks a variety of questions that measure respondents’ attitudes towards social and economic issues. Hence, I will be able to adjust for a wide range of attitudes. Control variables include social conservatism and support for the free market. Moreover, based on the information respondents provided, I can also adjust the demographic characteristics, including the level of education (four levels ranging from less than junior high school to graduate school and above), income (seven income brackets ranging from 0 to above 300,000 yuan roughly 48,000 USD at 2014 exchange rate), gender (indicator variable for male), and year of birth.

Empirical Expectations

Because of the non-continuous and ordinal characteristics of survey data, I use the ordered logistic regression model for regression analysis. For my hypotheses to be proven correct, the authoritarianism, measured by my authoritarian index, must show a statistically significant positive correlation in the regression with individual support for the use of military force. Moreover, the substantive influence of authoritarianism on hawkishness will have to be larger than that of nationalism.

On the other hand, if only nationalism is stronger predictor of hawkishness, or only the ethnocentric component of authoritarianism matters for hawkishness, then, authoritarianism should not have statistical significance. Instead, nationalism would correlate significantly and positively with hawkish preference. My study would then provide support for the existing nationalist explanation. There is also the third possibility that both authoritarian ideology and nationalism lead to higher levels of hawkishness, which would still offer some support for my hypothesis.

Empirical Component 1: Chinese Political Compass Survey (CPCS)

Descriptive data: CPCS Survey respondents are majority college-educated young males. 45 percent of the respondents are between the ages of 20 and 25. 64 percent are male. 67 percent have completed a bachelor degree or are in college. As the methodology section acknowledged, this survey is not a nationally representative sample. However, in the study of ideology, intrinsically motivated respondents sample might be more useful than a representative random sample that is tainted by non-response and social desirability bias. Figure 4 below
shows the distribution of respondents’ authoritarian index score and respondents’ nationalist score in CPCS data:

**Figure 4: Frequency of Authoritarian Index and nationalist score of respondents:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Distribution of Nationalism Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Frequency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Overall, the sample resembles normal distribution with more respondents score closer to the mean than to the two extremes. In addition, the sample as a whole leans slightly towards authoritarian (mean = .2966066) and slightly nationalistic (mean = .4338062). Hence, the 2014 Chinese Political Compass survey respondents tilt slightly towards the authoritarian side. Using score 0 as a benchmark, 53.42 percent of the respondents lean authoritarian and 42.96 percent are nationalistic leaning.

The Internet Protocol Version 4 (Ipv4) address of each respondent is recorded by as a part of the survey result. And each Ipv4 address corresponds to a physical geolocation. This allows me to geocode the location of respondents down to the county level. The map below is based on the location of respondents. Color differences illustrate the ideological leaning of each region (red being authoritarian and blue being liberal). The bubble size indicates the number of respondents in each location. As illustrated, the survey attracted respondents from a quite wide range of localities in China, particularly major east coast cities, such as Shanghai, and Guangzhou, as well as provincial capitals, such as Chengdu, Nanjing, and Jinnan. In addition, there are respondents across smaller cities across the eastern parts of the country. In terms of subnational ideological variation, the major urban center on the eastern coast tends to lean liberal while the much of the rest of the country leans authoritarian.
In terms of the dependent variable, there is considerable heterogeneity between liberal/democratic leaning respondents. Authoritarians’ level of hawkishness is more hawkish on both dimensions: Among those who view the U.S.’ with suspicion, 58 percent learn authoritarian and 34% lean liberal. Among those agree or strongly agree with the use of military force to unify Taiwan, 68% leans authoritarian, and only 25% lean liberal.

CPCS Analysis Result:

Figure 6 below is a first cut at the data represented in two scatterplot smoothing curves: the horizontal axis indicates respondents’ score on nationalism, from -4 denotes the least nationalistic and 4 denotes most nationalistic. The vertical axis indicates respondents’ willingness to use of military force. The respondents were divided into two groups: high authoritarian group and low authoritarian group. Here, high authoritarians are defined as respondents who scored more than one standard above the mean, and low authoritarians are defined as those who scored lower than one standard deviation below the mean.
Both the left and right panel demonstrate a significant difference between high and low authoritarian respondent’s support for the use of military force even when after matching their score on nationalism. While higher levels of nationalism is correlated with higher levels of hawkishness for both groups, high authoritarian groups consistently demonstrates a far higher willingness to use military force in a major conflict as well as a higher level of suspicion of U.S. intention.

The next step is to test whether the relationship depicted in Figure 6 is not the result of other material or ideational confounders such as level of education, age, gender, social conservatism or random coincidence. Ordinal dependent variable regression models allow me to adjust for a series of control variables such as free market beliefs, left-wing socialist economic beliefs, and social conservatism that could affect the level of individual hawkishness. Demographic characteristics including categorical income and education levels are included as additional control variables. I use five models to test empirically, my theoretical predication laid out in the previous sections namely the positive correlation between authoritarianism and two dimensions of hawkishness, distrust of foreign power, and the willingness to use military force. The results presented in Figure 7 use ordinal logistic modeling.

I begin with an empirical test of the conventional wisdom: nationalism as source of individual hawkishness. As Model 3 in Figure 7, without adjusting for authoritarianism, the result indicates a significant positive relationship between nationalism and individual support for the use of military force. Nationalism on the other hand, has no statistical significant relations with level of suspicion. This result indicates that nationalism does not have much effect on whether a Chinese respondent is suspicious of the strategic intention of the United States. Such result confirms a 2015 public opinion study, which suggests that Chinese who see the U.S. as a threat to China are not more nationalistic than those who do not regard the US as a threat to China (Gries et al. 2015). Nationalism, therefore, does not provide an adequate

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14 For example, for education variable, high school graduate is recorded as 1, college as 2, graduate and above as 3.
15 See appendix for full results using different models.
explanation for why some Chinese view the U.S. with suspicion. However, the level of education, gender and socialist economic beliefs have greater predictive power when it comes to suspicion of foreign power. Specifically, more educated, and male respondents are less suspicious of U.S. intention. On the contrary, both left-leaning socialist and social conservatives are most likely to believe that the U.S. would not allow China’s rise.

As Model 2 and 4 shows, after the introduction of the authoritarianism variable, nationalism variable loses its statistical significance and coefficient. The result indicates that authoritarianism, with a p-value < 0.001 and coefficients of 0.010, has a statistically significant positive correlation with the level of suspicion. The association between authoritarianism on willingness to use military force is far more significant. In Model 4, the coefficient on authoritarian index score is 0.102, indicating that authoritarianism is the most important ideational factor that is positively associated with support for the use military force. In Model 5, all questions are standardized (response to each question is standardized first before being combined. The combined value is standardized again), the authoritarianism variable continues show a strong positive correlation with Hawkishness while nationalism demonstrate a negative association.

**Figure 7: The Effect of Authoritarian Ideology on Individual Hawkishness**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Hawkishness</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Suspicion</td>
<td>Willingness to Use Military Force</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ordinal</td>
<td>Standardized</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model 1</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.010***</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.102***</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.715***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(11.71)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(116.47)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(114.58)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authoritarianism</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalism</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.004</td>
<td>0.069***</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>-0.027***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(1.35)</td>
<td>(24.37)</td>
<td>(0.18)</td>
<td>(5.16)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control Variables</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free Market</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.073***</td>
<td>-0.067***</td>
<td>-0.146***</td>
<td>-0.089***</td>
<td>-0.019***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(40.10)</td>
<td>(35.20)</td>
<td>(81.04)</td>
<td>(47.37)</td>
<td>(3.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socialism/Left</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.078***</td>
<td>0.073***</td>
<td>0.085***</td>
<td>0.035***</td>
<td>0.306***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(56.42)</td>
<td>(50.03)</td>
<td>(62.61)</td>
<td>(24.18)</td>
<td>(42.68)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Conservatism</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.072***</td>
<td>0.070***</td>
<td>0.070***</td>
<td>0.052***</td>
<td>0.283***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(44.34)</td>
<td>(42.86)</td>
<td>(43.67)</td>
<td>(32.28)</td>
<td>(49.45)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.040***</td>
<td>-0.040***</td>
<td>-0.040***</td>
<td>-0.038***</td>
<td>-0.032***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(13.97)</td>
<td>(13.82)</td>
<td>(13.98)</td>
<td>(13.28)</td>
<td>(10.92)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.173***</td>
<td>-0.180***</td>
<td>-0.056***</td>
<td>-0.129***</td>
<td>-0.124***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(22.36)</td>
<td>(23.20)</td>
<td>(7.28)</td>
<td>(16.62)</td>
<td>(16.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year of Birth</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.003***</td>
<td>0.003***</td>
<td>-0.011***</td>
<td>-0.020***</td>
<td>-0.021***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(4.94)</td>
<td>(3.70)</td>
<td>(16.24)</td>
<td>(28.87)</td>
<td>(29.36)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender (Male)</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.555***</td>
<td>-0.554***</td>
<td>0.152***</td>
<td>0.167***</td>
<td>0.201***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(55.09)</td>
<td>(55.03)</td>
<td>(15.45)</td>
<td>(16.85)</td>
<td>(20.47)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(3.29)</td>
<td>(2.05)</td>
<td>(30.95)</td>
<td>(17.83)</td>
<td>(31.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(5.19)</td>
<td>(3.94)</td>
<td>(29.05)</td>
<td>(15.99)</td>
<td>(29.15)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
To understand the effect of authoritarianism on the predictive power of nationalism, I added an interaction term between nationalism and authoritarianism. After the introduction of an interaction term, the statistical significance of nationalism increased significantly, though still not significant at 0.1 level. As expected, the interaction term carries a positive sign indicating the positive effect of nationalism on hawkishness depends on respondent’s level of authoritarianism. In other words, there is an addictive effect on hawkishness of being both an authoritarian and a nationalist. These results suggest that nationalism’s association with hawkishness, is a derivative, or a manifestation of authoritarianism. The positive effective of nationalism on individual hawkishness is contingent upon individual authoritarian leaning.

Figure 8. The Interactive Effect of Authoritarianism and Nationalism on individual Hawkishness

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Willingness to Use Military Force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Model 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authoritarianism</td>
<td>0.100*** (116.47)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalism</td>
<td>0.005 (0.18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interaction</td>
<td>0.005*** (13.29)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Control Variables not listed in this table is identical to those used in Model 1-4
Ordered Logistic Model
**p<0.1, ***p<0.01

The marginal effects

By dividing the sample into binary groupings of authoritarians and non-authoritarians, nationalists and non-nationalists, I can make an estimation of marginal effect of authoritarianism and nationalism on hawkishness. As Figure 9 shows, compared with non-authoritarian, authoritarians are 4 percent more likely to see the U.S. as intending to contain China, this marginal effect, though larger than that of nationalism, is still quite modest. However, authoritarianism has substantial effect on the support for the use of force. All else being equal, being an authoritarian is associated with a 25.25 percent increase of the chances that an individual supports the use of military force, compared with that of nationalism, which is merely 4.09 percent.

Much of the existing IR literature highlights the role of threat inflation as a source of hawkishness. Political psychologists also emphasized the role of “dangerous world view” as a mediator linking authoritarianism with aggression (Sibley, Wilson, and Duckitt 2007; Perry,
However, my analysis of CPCS data shows only a tenuous association between authoritarianism and higher threat perception suggesting that threat inflation is not a causal mechanism linking authoritarianism and hawkishness. In other words, as a mediator, threat perception cannot explain why authoritarians are more willing to support the use of force.

This uneven effect on threat perception and willingness to use force suggests that hawkishness is not a consequence of heuristic overreliance or cognitive bias. The linkage between suspicion and willingness to use force is not as close as Kahneman and Renshon (2009b) assumed. Instead, the marginal effects indicate that the relationship between authoritarianism and willingness to use force may reveal a form of ideologically motivated reasoning. Hence, the next section of the paper seeks to use a survey experiment to shed light on the causal mechanisms linking authoritarianism and support for the use of military force.

**Figure 9: Marginal Fixed Effect of Authoritarianism and Nationalism**

In order to explore the causal mechanisms through which authoritarianism affects individual hawkishness, I developed a survey experiment using a national security threat priming treatment. I recruited 736 subjects mostly located in Shanghai, Beijing, Taiyuan, and Guangzhou. Among the respondents, 56.9 percent are male, and 43.1 percent are female. I targeted subjects came from a relatively wide age span, roughly 22 percent born before 1981, 28 percent born between 1981 and 1990, 49 percent between 1991 and 2000. In terms of professions, 39 percent of subjects are students; among the rest are private sector professionals and civil servants, Chinese Communist Party cadres, and Communist Youth League cadres, as well as university researchers.

Drawing on elements of Imai, Keele, Tingley and Yamamoto’s (2011, 773, 781) parallel experiment design, the subjects are sorted into two matching groups, the high authoritarians — subjects who score higher than 0 and low authoritarians — subjects who scores equal to or

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below 0. This design reduces data imbalance in terms of treatment or control assignment. Then, both high authoritarian and low authoritarian subjects are randomly and evenly assigned into two controls and two treatment groups. Questions, in both the pre-treatment questionnaire and post-treatment questionnaire, are ordered randomly to minimize framing effect that might result from any particular ordering of questions.\(^\text{17}\)

Assuming that each subject already possesses a level of authoritarianism, in this causal mediation experiment, the treatment is a threat that designed to induce a change in level of hawkishness. The independent variable of my research, authoritarianism serves as the mediator between threat treatment and dependent variable outcome in this experiment. This causal mediation design allows for measuring the average difference in hawkishness from fixing the treatment status (threat/no threat) but altering the level of mediator (high authoritarianism/low authoritarianism). The purpose of the experiment is to elicit heterogeneous effects of threat treatment on high authoritarian and low authoritarian individuals. Given that this paper argues authoritarianism is a cause of hawkishness, I expect the high authoritarians to respond to the same unambiguous threat treatment with a greater increase in hawkishness.

**Figure 10: Experiment Protocol\(^\text{18}\)**

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**The Threat Treatment**

I use a national security threat treatment to elicit heterogeneous responses from high and low authoritarians. I present all subjects with an identical map with green dots marking roughly 60 Chinese cities. Figure 11 shows how the treatment interface would look like for subjects in

\(^{17}\) To maintain theoretical consistency, most questions, including are similar to those used in CPCS. The entire experiment instrument can be found in appendix 3.

\(^{18}\) Questions in both pre-treatment and post-treatment questionnaires are randomly ordered to reduce framing effect.
their web browsers or on their mobile devices. All subjects are asked to click on their approximate location so that they would look at the map carefully.¹⁹

On the one hand, subjects assigned into the treatment groups would be informed that the green dots denotes cities that are on a declassified US nuclear weapon target list, which I geocoded based on National Security Council (1959) archive documents. On the other hand, seeing the same map, subjects assigned to the control groups would be misled to believe that those green dots denote cities that participated in the 2016 national basketball league, a piece of innocuous misinformation expect to have no effect on hawkishness. The treatment/control instruments is presented as yet another question in the survey – all subjects are asked whether they or their family live in one of those marked cities. The treatment is designed to heighten the subjects’ sense of national security threat. In the post-treatment questionnaire assessing their level of hawkishness, subjects are presented with questions such as whether China should use force to unify Taiwan, and whether China should increase military deployment in the South China Sea.

Figure 11: Threat Treatment

Overall, authoritarianism continues to have the greatest positive marginal effect on subjects’ support for the use of military force. (when converted into binaries, 5 percent increase, p=0.026

¹⁹ This design is intended to get the respondent to focus on treatment or control instrument. Subjects’ actual geolocations is recorded automatically. So, it does not matter where the subjects click.
for increasing military deployment South China Sea, 17 percent increase, \( p=0.001 \) for use of military force to achieve unification with Taiwan). Moreover, to check the validity of my measurement of nationalism used in previous CPCS analysis, I introduce one additional measurement for nationalism: an agree-disagree question on “When I see the national flag flies, I cannot help but feel a sense of pride in being a Chinese” along with the two existing CPCS nationalism measurements. Nonetheless, neither the additional measurement nor its combination with the two existing CPCS questions has greater marginal effect on hawkishness than authoritarianism. The authoritarian hawkishness linkage is also reflected by the higher average willingness to use military force among high authoritarians shown in Figure 12.

**Figure 12: Average treatment effect**

![Graph showing treatment effect](image)

The threat treatment has a striking divergent effect for high authoritarians and low authoritarians. Not only do high authoritarians respond to the threat treatment with greater hawkishness, the nuclear threat treatment actually reduces hawkishness among low authoritarians. The absolute value of average treatment effect is smaller for high authoritarians, which is potentially a result of compression effect since authoritarian has a much higher level of willingness to use force to begin with.

This divergence of treatment effect provides strong support for the overarching causal theory linking authoritarianism and hawkishness. With a \( p \)-value of 0.051 and coefficient of 0.178, the treatment led to an increase of individual support for the use of force among high authoritarians. On the contrary, the treatment led to a substantial decrease of hawkishness among low authoritarians \( (p = 0.034) \). While for both group, increase in authoritarianism is associated with greater support for the use of military force (results significant at \( p<0.001 \) level).
Table 13: Divergent effect of threat treatment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Hawkishness: Support for the use of military force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High Authoritarians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treatment</td>
<td>0.178* (1.93)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authoritarianism</td>
<td>0.516*** (3.65)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Control Variables include: socialism, conservatism, free market beliefs, nationalism, year of birth, annual income, and gender. a. authoritarian index score >0, b. authoritarian index score <0, Authoritarianism is divided into quartiles.
Ordered Probit Model
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05 *** p <0.01

Figure 14 illustrates the divergent treatment effect: the red line represents the relationship between authoritarianism and support for the use of force in the treatment group, and the grey line represents the control group results. Just as the divergent coefficient suggests, among subjects who scores low on authoritarianism, treatment leads to a lower level of willingness to use force, potentially reflecting a deterrence effect under which the subject mindful of the cost of nuclear escalation with the U.S. is less willing to use military force in Taiwan and South China Sea. On the contrary, high authoritarians primed by the threat treatment became more willingness to use force. The two lines intersects when authoritarian index value close to zero (neither authoritarian nor liberal). Figure 14 also illustrates that the average treatment effect on both extremes of the authoritarian-liberal spectrum are greater indicating the mediator has a “dose effect” consistent with the theoretical prediction. In other words, the experiment result suggests that, whereas threat deters low authoritarians, it provokes high authoritarians.
Figure 14: Divergent effect of national security threat treatment:

Cost of using military force

Moreover, the experiment also sheds light on how potential cost associated with the use of force interacts with individual ideology in shaping individual hawkishness. To test whether the cost of using military force matters for individual willingness to support it, I employed two agree-disagree questions assessing subject support for the use of military force in two contingencies with vastly difference levels of cost. The low-cost contingency question asks subjects their view on the statement “China should increase military deployment in the South China Sea”. This is an extremely low-cost use of military force that does not involve any cost to individual. Facing such as low-cost contingency, the majority of the respondents including the low authoritarians tend to agree with deployment increase (see Figure 15).
However, the subjects are also presented with a high cost contingency, assessing their view on “China should use military force to achieve unification with Taiwan”. Given the potentially high casualty and material cost for individual citizens of a war over Taiwan, there is greater reluctance over the use of force. As Gould (1999, 359) puts it, even if we assume that all group members benefit if the group acts collectively in defense of its shared security interests of a collective, members of a collective might hesitate before joining a deadly fray. Use of force in a Taiwan contingency involves not only direct cost of conflict, but also escalation into a major war with the United States. Even limited conventional US involvement could impose a high cost for China. A RAND (2005) simulation of a theoretical 2017 conflict estimated that United States submarine force alone could sink 41 percent of Chinese amphibious ships, resulting in heavy human and material cost. Besides, the risk of nuclear escalation is often widely acknowledged. In 2005, Major General Zhu Chenghu (2005), Dean of China’s National Defense University (NDU) stated that “We Chinese will prepare ourselves for the sacrifice of all the cities east of Xi’an” where more than 800 million people live. General Zhu’s comment is perhaps a hyperbole, but it does reveal that there is little illusion over a costless easy victory in a cross-strait war. And the cost of military option in a Taiwan contingency is not unfamiliar to the Chinese public. Although Washington took an ambiguous position on its security commitment to Taiwan stipulated in the Taiwan Relations Act (1979), after the U.S. show of force during the 1996-1997 Taiwan Strait Crisis and the US intervention in Kosovo, Chinese policy analysts and
Chinese media take as a working assumption that conflict between mainland China and Taiwan will mean conflict with a intervening United States (David M. Finkelstein 2001, 13). The consensus about U.S. military involved is summed up Yan Xuetong (2000), one of China’s leading security analysts, “There are no two ways about the United States becoming militarily involved in the Taiwan strait, and the possibility of them not getting involved does not exist; the only question is the degree of involvement”. Given the potentially high casualty and material cost for individual citizens of a war over Taiwan, there is greater reluctance over the use of force.

Presented with a high cost contingency, subject support for the use of force became divided along the high-low authoritarian line with the high authoritarian continue to support the use of force while low authoritarians tend to disagree. Cost difference is also reflected in subnational variation. Adjusting for other determinants, CPCS respondents in Fujian, coastal province facing Taiwan directly, are less likely to support using military force against Taiwan compared with respondents in other parts of the country, though the same respondents are no less supportive of increasing military deployment in the South China Sea. The varying level of hawkishness suggests that the same individual might not be consistently hawkish or dovish because of the ideological doctrine. Rather, the ideological factor interacts with rational cost calculation in shaping individual hawkishness.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Summary of Find</th>
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<th>Reason</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hypothesis 1: Authoritarianism is positively correlated with hawkishness</td>
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<td>Authoritarianism shows a strong positive correlation with the support for the use of force. While other covariates are better predictors of suspicion.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H1.1 Authoritarianism is positively correlated with suspicion of foreign power</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H1.2 Authoritarianism is positively correlated with willingness to use military force</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hypothesis 2: Authoritarianism has a more significant role in shaping individual hawkishness than nationalism.</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Nationalism does matter but not as much as authoritarianism or other covariates.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hypothesis 3: Authoritarianism is positively associated with hawkishness because authoritarians are more collectivist and willing to pay personal cost for achieving collective objectives</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Authoritarians are more cost tolerant, less likely to be deterred.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hypothesis 4: Authoritarianism is positively associated with hawkishness because authoritarians are more punitive and willing to take forceful action against an adversary.</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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</table>
IV. Discussion

Causal Mechanisms: collectivism and punitiveness

Why does authoritarianism affect individual support for the use of military force? I propose that two causal mechanisms — collectivism and punitiveness — are at play. Collectivism is, essentially, the subordination of individual interest to societal interest, which sometime involves sacrifice of individual interest for the societal interests. Given the cost of hawkish foreign policy, such as economic disruption, conscription, and danger to ones’ life and property, a collectivist authoritarian would be more tolerant of personal loss for state’s interest in a costly war. Moreover, authoritarians are more punitive in the sense that they are more likely to favor forceful punishment targeting threat to the state and society domestically. I argue that the punitive tendency of authoritarians extends into foreign policy domain, making them supporters of the use of military force.

I use two questions in the CPCS to access respondent’s level of collectivist attitude: (a) “In the decision-making of major (infrastructure) projects, individual interests should give way to social interests.” (b) “Even with population pressures, the state and the society have no right to interfere in the decision to have a child, or how many children to have”. The first question assesses individual’s collectivism on an abstract level. The second question related to one-child policy an authoritarian state intervention into the private affairs of citizen, asks respondent to think about whether individual interests should be subordinate to collective interest in a deeply personally way. Put together, the two questions provide an approximate measure of individual’s willingness to subordinate their own interests to state interests. Likewise, two questions are used to measure punitiveness: (c) “Even if procedural rules are violated in the process of investigation and evidence gathering, those who have committed crimes should be punished”. (d) “Lawyers should do their utmost to defend clients even if the client has committed a crime”.

Figure 16: Collectivist tendency and punitiveness of authoritarians
As the histograms above shows, there is a sharp difference between high and low authoritarian respondents over collectivism and punitiveness. High authoritarians are far more willing to sacrifice individual interests for the state. Low authoritarians, on the other hand, prioritize individual interest over the national collective. As a result, an armed conflict, particularly one with the U.S. that could have catastrophic consequence for individual’s live, property and safety of their family.

Additionally, high authoritarians are far more punitive than the low authoritarians. High authoritarians are more likely to agree with the statement arguing that criminals should be punished even if extralegal means are used. The punitive orientation reflected in the CPCS is consistent with a series of prior studies revealing a strong correlation between support for punitive measures, such as death penalty, and authoritarianism (Altemeyer 1988; Mckee and Feather 2008; A. G. Smith and Winter 2002). As Maoz and Russett (1993, 625) point out, the premise of any ideational explanation in international relations is that “different norms of domestic political conduct will be expressed in terms of different patterns of international behavior”. Hence, the following section will discuss how authoritarians externalize their punitiveness and collectivism in domestic arena into the foreign policy domain.

**Causal Pathways**

Having demonstrated how authoritarianism is associated with collectivism and punitiveness, I then connect the causal chain by showing how collectivism and punitiveness affect support for the use of military force. I convert the two mechanisms — collectivism and punitiveness — into binary variables. Then, I calculated the marginal effect of two mechanisms on support for the use of military force, while holding another variables constant. Both mechanisms are included in the same model with one mechanism serving a control variable for the other mechanism. In this way, the effects of punitiveness mechanism collectivism mechanism can be distinguished from each other. The marginal effect for punitiveness and collectivism are 5.8 percent and 6.9 percent respectively. Both estimates are statistically significant at $p =0.001$ level.

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20 To avoid tautology, the two collectivists, and two punitiveness questions were not included when categorizing high and low this particular visualization. Specific to this visualization, respondents that are one standard deviation above the mean of authoritarian index is coded as high authoritarians; respondents one standard deviation below the mean is coded as low authoritarians.
Collectivism: raising cost tolerance

Existing public opinion literature on hawkishness shows that a key determinant of public support for the use of military force is a cost-benefit analysis. Mueller (1973) was among the first proposing a theory of cost-aversion based on his examination of US public support for the wars in Korea and Vietnam. He finds that support for war is inversely related to the log of cumulative casualties. Specifically, “every time American casualties increased by a factor of 10, support for the war dropped by about 15 percentage percent points” (Mueller 1973, 60). This pattern of cost aversion is observed by both quantitative researchers (Gartner 2008, 105), and qualitative theorists (Luttwak 1996, 36). It’s possible for perceived benefit of conflict or greater enemy casualty to mitigate the adverse effect of cost on public support for the use of force (Mark Lorell, Charles Kelley, and Deborah Hensler 1985, 22; Boettcher and Cobb 2006, 832; Gelpi 2010). In short, like rational consumers, individual citizens weigh the expected costs and benefits of a military action (Gartner 2008).

Facing the prospect of costly conflict, authoritarians who are collectivists are more willing to bear the cost of war if such war is in the perceived interests of the state. This collectivist willingness to make personal sacrifice for collective goal is what some psychologists calls “parochial altruism” (De Dreu et al. 2010, 1408). While individualists see the “self” as being independent, collectivists are more likely to see self as interdependent (Markus and Kitayama. 1991, 225). Individualists are more likely to conceive self as unrelated to a collective. Collectivists see the self as a part of a collective, such as family, party, or nation. The collectivist and individualists leaning alters individual cost-benefit calculation, with individualists less willing to take costly action, and under public observation, while the collectivists derive satisfaction from a costly action that is perceived to be benefiting the group.
(Markus and Kitayama. 1991, 248; Triandis 1989, 515). In other words, authoritarian ideology raises individuals cost tolerance when forming use of force preference. The collectivist tendency of authoritarianism significantly alters the cost-benefit calculation of individual citizens regarding the use of war as policy instrument. Authoritarian who consider individual interests as being subordinate to societal interest is more willing to make sacrifice in order to advance national interests, even if the hawkish choice of conflict is extremely costly.

**Figure 18: Cost Tolerance**

![Cost Tolerance Graph](image)

The difference of support for the use of force in a low-cost vs. high-cost contingency allows me to measure the level of cost tolerance, smaller the difference, the more cost tolerant an individual is. As the Figure 18 above illustrates, high authoritarians are more risk tolerant (significant at p < 0.001 level). By subordinating individual interests and needs to the priority of a collective, collectivism serves the “binding” function of constraining self-interested behaviors to benefit the collective (Graham, Haidt, and Nosek 2017, 1030). In the same way that authoritarians are willing to forgo individual needs for reproduction for state population planning, and forego property rights for infrastructure projects, they are more tolerant of personal sacrifice in safety and property for a potentially costly war to achieve the collective goal of achieving unification with Taiwan. In a low-cost contingency such as increasing military deployment in the South China Sea, most respondents support use of force to defend China’s sovereignty claim; a liberal might be as hawkish as an authoritarian. But when push comes to shove, it is the authoritarians who are willing to bear the hefty cost of a major war.

**Punitiveness: raising the willingness to punish**

The punitive component of authoritarianism makes authoritarian more willing to punish any threats, foreign or domestic. Punitiveness is rooted in one’s conviction to defend an established norm, and authority by punishing those who perceived to be posing a threat. A rich literature on authoritarian personality has identified the authoritarian tendency to support
punishing those who deviates from the conventional norms or threatens the authority. CPCS data also reveals punitiveness is positively associated with the belief that maintain unity is the highest interest of a society (result significant at p < 0.001 level).

Authoritarians valuing conformity and in-group unity are more likely to take a retributive, punitive approach to punishment. According to this retributive approach, a crime or a threat should not only be punished in order to maximize future security, but also because the offender or enemy deserves to be punished. Both CPCS survey and my experiment data demonstrates that authoritarians possess a punitive logic which applies to domestic “enemies” – criminals; the authoritarians are more likely to agree with the proposition that criminals who committed a crime should be punished even if the evidence gathering process is compromised. At the same time, authoritarian is less likely to believe a lawyer should do his/her best to defend a guilty client. These attitudes — the commitment to punish the guilty without concern over procedural justice, activates psychological mechanisms that desensitize people to the costs of achieving the punitive goal (Warr and Stafford 1984; Skitka 2010).

A variety of experiments in the United States and Canada revealed authoritarians’ greater willingness to punish perceived threats: a series of individual or group ranging from political dissents, such as Communist, to ethnic minorities, such as Jewish and African Americans, from members of domestic racist group such as the KKK to foreign terrorists such as Al-Qaeda. As longer as those aforementioned groups or individuals are framed as threat to society or national security, authoritarians are likely to states that they support forcefully punish these enemies, foreign or domestic. Authoritarians even indicated their willingness to actively identify, and denunciate those such individuals within their communities to the authority (Altemeyer 1988, 114–17; Bilewicz et al. 2015). The authoritarian support for forceful punitive measure is so consistent that even when they are told authoritarians pose a threat to the state and society, they continue to support persecuting the authoritarians (Altemeyer 2006, 25).

The same punitiveness can be applied to individual reasoning regarding foreign policy issues – threat to national security and violator of norm should be punished with force and coercion. Onderco and Wagner’s (2017, 296) recent study find the more punitive a country is (measured by prison population), the less accommodating and the more coercive a country’s foreign policy. Similarly, Stein (2012, 22) who investigated the linkage between retributions punitive value in personal, societal and foreign policy domains, finds strong correlation among that individual willingness to use violence against personal threat – a person who punch you in the face, death penalty for a domestic criminal threat — rapist, and use of military force against international threat — foreign adversaries and terrorists. As Stein points out, individuals draw on deeply held ensuring beliefs to form opinion about the use of violence in all three domains: interpersonal, the use of force by state in domestic criminal-justice setting, and international politics.

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21 Hawkishness is measured by a survey of 173 expert regarding how confrontational 22 states’ policy towards Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK).
Whether the target of military action is actually “guilty” of “wrongdoing” is immaterial, what elicit punitive response is defined from the perspective of the punisher, rather than the victim or some impartial observer (Stein 2012, 38). It is not uncommon for leaders to frame hawkish policy as a retributive punishment of an adversary’s wrong doing. Adversarial action in geopolitical conflict can easily be framed as an insult, threat or affront. This is certainly the case in China, competing claimants in the South China Sea are seen as making territorial gain at the expense of legitimate Chinese claim (Hua 2017). And no perceived betrayal would be greater than a de jure secession of Taiwan or potential US military intervention backing such secession. In a single case of the 2000 cross strait tension, one can find ample examples of punitive language and framing. In the official press, Taiwanese secessionism is seen as “provocation (tiao xin, 挑衅)” (People’s Daily 2000). Facing the prospect of a secessionist presidential candidate, Chen Shui-bian, being elected in the 2000 Taiwanese presidential election, Chinese Primer Zhu Rongji (2000) emphasized that “We will never forsake the use of military force … Whoever pursues the session of Taiwan, you'll come to no good! Because you betrayed the will of Chinese people across the Taiwan Strait”. An article entitled “Taiwan Secession means war” published on the People’s Liberation Army daily (2000), official publication of the Chinese military warned that “He that does evil shall find evil. And secessionism is the greatest evil one can do, for which punishments shall be met”.

Prior simulation experiments shed light on the insensitivity of authoritarians to deterrence. In 1987, Sande and Altemeyer (1996, 328; 2006) conducted a laboratory experiment on authoritarian individuals’ behavior preference in an international conflict situation illustrates how authoritarian dispositions interact with cost-benefit analysis. Ten teams of male college students were asked to independently play “NATO” in a war game simulation against “Warsaw Pact” played by the same faculty experimenters. Five teams were made-up by male students scored high on Altemeyer’s authoritarianism (RWA) scale. The other five teams were made up of male students scored low on authoritarianism. Every “NATO” teams were asked to respond to ambiguous actions of “Warsaw Pact”, such as unexpected military exercise, or redeployment of troops to the rear, with either inaction, peaceful overtures or threatening moves. The “Warsaw Pact”, in turn, always reacted to any NATO action with a move that is twice as threatening. In other words, peaceful NATO move would be meet with relative peaceful Warsaw Pact response, and threatening move leads to even more threatening Warsaw Pact countermove. By the end of the simulation, the five high-authoritarian teams on average made ten times more threatening moves as the low-authoritarian teams and the result was significant at p < 0.05 level.

Moreover, the high authoritarian teams were consistently more hawkish than their low-authoritarian counterparts even when a treatment was introduced into the experiment, giving the “Warsaw Pact” a hypothetically impenetrable missile defense system. Treatment group results suggest that authoritarians may prefer punishment and aggressive measure even when such measure is detrimental to their security. It is worth noting that threat perception does not

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22 Altemeyer’s Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) scale define “right wing” in psychological terms such as obedient to authority, conventionalism, and dogmatism. It does not correspondent to political right or left.
fundamentally change authoritarian players’ hawkishness in the simulation. In the treatment groups that gives “NATO” impenetrable missile defense, low authoritarian team responded with peaceful actions hardly made any escalatory move (Altemeyer 1996, 329). However, when high authoritarian team was given the impenetrable missile defense treatment, they are 50 times more likely to make escalatory moves.

The willingness to punish combined with high cost tolerance has significant implication for deterrence theory: while nuclear deterrence reduces hawkishness of low authoritarians just as the classical deterrence theory assumes, high authoritarian may become more hawkish. Unlike the many of the IR studies in the US that measures hawkishness as individual support for the use for military force against a relative weak state such as Iraq and Syria. The combination of Taiwan contingency and nuclear threat treatment offers striking insight into hawkishness in the context of potential great power conflict where nuclear deterrence is an ever-present factor. Though mutual deterrence between nuclear-armed major powers are often taken for granted (Jervis 1989; Monteiro 2014, 87; Posen 2014, 21, 90, 198), my experiment provides some indications that some individual such as authoritarians are less likely to be deterred. Rational deterrence theory rests on the manipulation of costs (Mercer 2005, 86). As a result, individual preferences vary greatly depending on risk tolerance and relative emphasis on the value of punishment. In the context of nuclear proliferation in Iraq, Iran, and North Korea, It has often been debated whether some type of authoritarian state or autocratic leaders are “irrational” and “undeterrable” (Jervis 2003, 318; Posen 2014, 116; Wolfowitz 2003; Pollack 2003; Pollack 2005). This study finds indications that, even with the awesome force of nuclear weapons, it might be more difficult to deter authoritarians. For authoritarians, who are cost tolerant, and determined to punish any perceived threat, a deterrence signal might be interpreted as a provocation triggering a chain of escalatory interactions. The counterintuitive reaction of authoritarian to deterrence and other cost signal highlighted the importance of studying authoritarian disposition at the leader level.

Alternative Explanation:

Ideological Distance?

A key question remains: the correlation between authoritarian ideology and hawkishness can be interpreted in two very different ways. The first possible explanation is that authoritarian ideology itself leads to hawkishness. However, because the Chinese Political Compass survey measures the hawkishness of Chinese citizens towards two democratic adversaries — Taiwan and the United States — an alternative causal mechanism is that the ideological distance between authoritarian China and its two democratic adversaries generates hawkishness. Oneal and Russett (1997, 283) find that democracy-authoritarian dyads are prone to conflict like “cats and dogs”. Then, is the authoritarian-hawkishness linkage in China a manifestation of the “cats and dogs” phenomenon at the microlevel?

To address this ideological distance explanation, I test the same theory on a U.S. population using the 2012 American National Election Studies Survey (ANES 2013) administered after the 2012 presidential election. The ANES has a nationally representative sample. It includes a four-
item child-rearing scale to measure authoritarianism. In this survey, hawkishness is measured by
the respondents’ view on “Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose, invading with
U.S. forces to remove the Iranian government from power”. If ideological distance is the source
of hawkishness, then we should expect more liberal leaning (low authoritarians) to support the
use of force against Iran, an authoritarian regime. Whereas the ideological distance explanation
would expect high authoritarians to find little ideological reason to attack foreign authoritarian
regimes. In other words, if the ideological distance explanation is valid, the authoritarianism
variable should take on a negative coefficient in the regression analysis. On the contrary, as
Figure 19 indicates, even when individual citizens in a democracy facing authoritarian
adversary, authoritarianism continues to be the strongest positive predictor of hawkishness. The
ANES results also suggests that authoritarian-hawkishness linkage has external validity beyond
the China case.

Figure 19: The Effect of Authoritarianism on American Hawkishness

<table>
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<tr>
<th>The Effect of Authoritarianism on American Hawkishness</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hawkishness</td>
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<tr>
<td>Willingness to Use Military Force</td>
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<td>Model 11</td>
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<td>Ordinal</td>
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<td>Authoritarianism</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nationalism</td>
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<td>Free Market</td>
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<td>Socialism/Left</td>
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<tr>
<td>Conservatism–Liberal Self-Placement Scale (Conservative)</td>
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<td>Inverse</td>
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<tr>
<td>Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cut1</td>
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<td>Observations</td>
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Note: US Comparison
Ordered Logistic Model
*p<0.05; **p<0.01
Substantive implications
My study reveals that authoritarian political ideology is a strong predictor of hawkish foreign policy preference. Besides, the CPCS data suggests that, measured by the age cohort, younger generations of respondents tend to be more authoritarian. Such variation can be explained by more formal education that younger generations received compared with older generations. Contrary to the conventional wisdom that education leads to liberal political beliefs such as respect for human rights and political equality, the level of education is the most salient positive predictor of authoritarian leaning particularly in the belief that people not endowed with an understanding of democracy should not have the right to vote ($p < 0.001$). But the respondents born after 1990 are less nationalist than the 1980s generation. On the other hand, higher income only has a negligible negative correlation on authoritarianism. These correlational evidence and generational variation suggests that Chinese education is quite effective in cultivating authoritarian ideology among the younger generations. Moreover, the rising authoritarianism among young Chinese might also be a reflection of meso-level antidestabilist-antidestabilist dynamics (King et al. 2017, 6). Hence, nationalism might not be on the rise, but authoritarianism might be. At the same time, the authoritarian beliefs are likely to be externalized. More authoritarian citizens of younger generation are more likely to hold hawkish foreign policy preference, favoring the use of military force.

Figure 20: Authoritarian leaning of different Age Cohorts

Theoretical Implication:
So far, this paper finds empirical evidence suggesting that authoritarian ideology is positively associated with more hawkish foreign policy preference. Nonetheless, whether or how such individual level dynamics aggregates into state level policy outcome remains to be established. In this sense, this study can serve as a proof of concept for further research exploring the authoritarian microfoundations of the rally-around-the-flag effect. Moreover, much of the psychological research in international relations addresses the problem of cognitive biases — psychological process from rational behavior expectation due to problems of information processing. Much less has been said about motivated reasoning — conscious and subconscious alteration of preference (Montibeller and von Winterfeldt 2015, 1231). This paper suggests the
ideologically rooted motivated reasoning can play an important role in the study of international relations.

**Conclusion:**

This paper examined the relationship between authoritarianism and individual support for the use of military force. My empirical investigations provide support for four hypotheses: First, compared with nationalism, authoritarian ideology is a more salient source of individual hawkishness in China. Secondly, all else being equal, authoritarian-leaning citizens are much more likely to support use of military force than their liberal-leaning counterparts. Thirdly, my experiment sheds light on causal mechanisms, particularly the higher cost tolerance of authoritarians’ due to their collectivist tendency — a willingness to bear individual costs for archiving the collective goal. Fourth, authoritarian externalize their punitiveness in domestic politics into foreign policy arena. The linkage between authoritarianism and hawkishness as well as the heterogenous individual response to national security threat highlight the importance of decomposing key concepts such as audience cost, and diversionary wars along ideological cleavages.

The assumption that nationalism leads to hawkishness is not unique to the study of Chinese foreign policy or public opinion, this paper suggests that the centrality of nationalism in shaping bellicosity cannot be presumed, and a more nuanced understanding of the microfoundations of hawkishness is warranted. Moreover, my experiment shows how ideational and dispositional factors such as values and beliefs interact with the process rationalist calculation such as cost-aversion. Thus, this paper highlights the need for international relation research to go beyond the dichotomy between the logic of appropriateness and the logic of consequence. The two logics are intertwined. Different ideological tendencies alter how individuals form their policy preferences in heterogeneous ways.

The microlevel variable, such as authoritarianism, that have implications for state-level policy and system-level logic can enrich mid-level and macro-level and international relations theories. Waltz (1979, 93–94) argued that domestic and international politics are distinct arena where disparate logics prevail. The present study, however, shows that the same basic values and disposition that people use to guide choices in domestic politics also travel to the arena of foreign policy. Both foreign and domestic policy attitude stems from a set of underlying meaningfully-organized beliefs (Berman et al. 2007, 380; Converse 2006). Just as American public opinion shows a tendency to externalize liberal ideological belief about democracies and human rights, Chinese citizens’ hawkish policy preferences are also ideologically grounded, albeit different sets of ideals valuing authority, order, punishment, and the primacy of collective interests over individual interests.
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Appendix 0: Code book

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<td>Authoritarianism</td>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>People should not have universal suffrage if they have not been educated about democracy.</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Western multiparty systems are unsuitable for China.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Indiscriminately imitating (systems of) western-style freedom of speech will lead to social disorder in China.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Primary school, secondary school, and college students should all participate in government organized military training.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Even if procedural rules are violated in the process of investigation and evidence gathering, those who have committed crimes should be punished.</td>
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<tr>
<td>In the decision-making of major (infrastructure) projects, individual interests should give way to social interests.</td>
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<tr>
<th>Reverse-coded items</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Human rights take precedence over sovereignty.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Religious leaders and adherents should be allowed to conduct missionary work in nonreligious spaces.</td>
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<tr>
<td>It is acceptable besmirch the images of national leaders and founding leaders in literary and artistic works.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lawyers should do their utmost to defend clients even if the client has committed a crime.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Even with population pressures, the state and the society have no right to interfere in the decision to have a child, or how many children to have.</td>
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人权高于主权。

国家领导人及开国领袖的形象可以作为文艺作品的丑化对象。

律师即使明知被辩护人的犯罪事实也应当尽力为其进行辩护。

即使有人口压力，国家和社会也无权干涉个人要不要孩子，要几个孩子。
Appendix 1: Robustness checks for regression analysis of CPCS.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table A1. The Effect of Nationalism on Individual Hawkishness</th>
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<tbody>
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<td><strong>Hawkishness</strong></td>
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<td>Socialism/Left</td>
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<tr>
<td>Social Conservatism</td>
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<tr>
<td>Income</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year of Birth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender (Male)</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cut2</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Cut3</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Note: Nationalism
<sup>a</sup> Ordered Probit Model
<sup>b</sup> Ordered Logistic Model
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01
A2: LOESS curve

**Authoritarianism**

- **Obedience**: Support and obedience of authority that is perceived to be legitimate
- **Conventionalism**: Adherence to social convention, and norms perceived as legitimate
- **Punitive Aggression**: Preference for aggressive punitive measures against perceived threat to legitimate authority and norms that are sanctioned by the authorities

**Antidisestablishmentarianism**, **Opposing Democratization**

**Collectivism**

**Anti-liberalism**

Prioritizing order over freedom of speech of information freedom

Support harsher punishment of domestic and foreign enemies
Table A3 The Effect of Authoritarianism on American Hawkishness

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Hawkishness</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Suspicion</td>
<td>Willingness to Use Military Force</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Model 9a</td>
<td>Model 10b</td>
<td>Model 11a</td>
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<tr>
<td>Authoritarianism</td>
<td>-0.010</td>
<td>-0.018</td>
<td>0.070**</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.93)</td>
<td>(0.80)</td>
<td>(9.77)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nationalism</td>
<td>0.183**</td>
<td>0.350**</td>
<td>0.052**</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(11.23)</td>
<td>(11.38)</td>
<td>(4.47)</td>
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Control Variables

<p>| | | | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Model 9a</td>
<td>Model 10b</td>
<td>Model 11a</td>
<td>Model 12b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free Market</td>
<td>0.168**</td>
<td>0.311*</td>
<td>-0.091*</td>
<td>-0.160**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.58)</td>
<td>(2.40)</td>
<td>(2.33)</td>
<td>(2.47)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socialism/Left</td>
<td>0.030</td>
<td>0.064</td>
<td>-0.094**</td>
<td>-0.155**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.56)</td>
<td>(1.71)</td>
<td>(8.16)</td>
<td>(8.04)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Conservatism-Liberal</td>
<td>0.020</td>
<td>0.033</td>
<td>0.017*</td>
<td>0.031*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Conservative)</td>
<td>(1.58)</td>
<td>(1.38)</td>
<td>(2.04)</td>
<td>(2.24)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0.029**</td>
<td>-0.015**</td>
<td>-0.025**</td>
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<td>(4.64)</td>
<td>(4.46)</td>
<td>(7.21)</td>
<td>(7.48)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>-0.012</td>
<td>-0.005*</td>
<td>-0.008*</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(1.31)</td>
<td>(1.28)</td>
<td>(2.36)</td>
<td>(2.29)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.009**</td>
<td>0.018**</td>
<td>-0.006**</td>
<td>-0.010**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(5.34)</td>
<td>(5.31)</td>
<td>(5.81)</td>
<td>(5.76)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0.060</td>
<td>-0.042</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.51)</td>
<td>(0.55)</td>
<td>(1.23)</td>
<td>(1.70)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cut1</td>
<td>0.484**</td>
<td>1.174**</td>
<td>0.241*</td>
<td>0.395**</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.71)</td>
<td>(3.41)</td>
<td>(2.12)</td>
<td>(2.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td>1.044**</td>
<td>1.734**</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(9.13)</td>
<td>(9.05)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Observations | 4,853

Note: US Comparison

a Ordered Probit Model
b Ordered Logistic Model

* p<0.05; ** p<0.01
Appendix 2: Chinese Political Compass Survey (CPCS)

*The following questions are randomly ordered

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Survey Questions</th>
<th>Coding</th>
<th>Mean</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>People should not have universal suffrage if they have not been educated about democracy.</td>
<td>suf</td>
<td>-0.092257</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human rights take precedence over sovereignty.</td>
<td>hr</td>
<td>0.2653054</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>When events that have major repercussions for the safety and security of people occur, the government should freely disseminate information even if information disclosure increases the risks of unrest.</td>
<td>ff</td>
<td>-0.154694</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western multiparty systems are unsuitable for China.</td>
<td>awd</td>
<td>-0.2420553</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indiscriminately imitating (systems of) western-style freedom of speech will lead to social disorder in China.</td>
<td>awfs</td>
<td>0.1943666</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious leaders and adherents should be allowed to conduct missionary work in nonreligious spaces.</td>
<td>fr</td>
<td>-0.3353995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary school, secondary school, and college students should all participate in government organized military training.</td>
<td>mt</td>
<td>-0.067356</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National unity and territorial integrity are the highest interest of society.</td>
<td>uni</td>
<td>0.2824969</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Even if procedural rules are violated in the process of investigation and evidence gathering, those who have committed crimes should be punished.</td>
<td>adp</td>
<td>0.0916315</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The state has an obligation to provide foreign aid.</td>
<td>fa</td>
<td>0.1174041</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It is acceptable besmirch the images of national leaders and founding leaders in literary and artistic works.</td>
<td>arl</td>
<td>0.3642597</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If it has sufficient state capabilities, China has the right to take any action to defend its national interests.</td>
<td>an</td>
<td>0.3379628</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Force should be used to reunify Taiwan with China if conditions permit.</td>
<td>autw</td>
<td>-0.1248784</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lawyers should do their utmost to defend clients even if the client has committed a crime.</td>
<td>lr</td>
<td>0.1740177</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Survey Questions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Survey Questions</th>
<th>Coding</th>
<th>Mean</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chinese citizens should be allowed to hold foreign citizenship.  应当允许中国公民同时具有外国国籍。</td>
<td>dn</td>
<td>-3.632111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It is impossible for Western countries led by the United States to tolerate the rise of China into a major power.  以美国为首的西方国家不可能真正容许中国崛起成为一流强国。</td>
<td>usc</td>
<td>-5.802802</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The state should take measures to train and support athletes so they can win glory for the country in various international competitions.  国家应当采取措施培养和支持体育健儿在各种国际比赛场合为国争光。</td>
<td>spn</td>
<td>0.8391366</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The minimum wage should be set by the state.  最低工资应由国家规定。</td>
<td>minw</td>
<td>-3.546591</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The fruits of China's economic development since reform and opening up are enjoyed by a small group of people; most people have not received much benefit.  中国改革开放以来的经济发展的成果都被一小群人占有了，大多数人没得到什么好处。</td>
<td>crony</td>
<td>0.1525152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In the decision-making of major (infrastructure) projects, individual interests should give way to social interests.  在重大工程项目的决策中，个人利益应该为社会利益让路。</td>
<td>col</td>
<td>0.0792753</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wasting food is an individual freedom.  浪费粮食也是个人的自由。</td>
<td>wff</td>
<td>-0.5792316</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If the price of pork is too high, the government should intervene.  如果猪肉价格过高，政府应当干预。</td>
<td>ppc</td>
<td>0.1659783</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A high tariff should be imposed on imported goods that are also produced domestically to protect national industries.  应当对国外同类产品征收高额关税来保护国内民族工业。</td>
<td>indp</td>
<td>-0.4053305</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education should be public to the greatest extent.  教育应当尽可能公立。</td>
<td>pe</td>
<td>-0.3923335</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The interests of state-owned enterprises are part of the national interest.  国有企业的利益属于国家利益。</td>
<td>soe</td>
<td>0.3175672</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attempting to control real estate prices will undermine economic development.  试图控制房地产价格的行为会破坏经济发展。</td>
<td>appc</td>
<td>-0.6075092</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The primary means to improve the lives of the low-income people is to give them fiscal subsidies and support.  改善低收入者生活的首要手段是国家给予财政补贴和扶持。</td>
<td>ws</td>
<td>-0.2771839</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rich people deserve better medical services.  有钱人理应获得更好的医疗服务。</td>
<td>rmr</td>
<td>-0.316606</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High-income earners should disclose the source of their income.  高收入者应该公开自己的经济来源。</td>
<td>hip</td>
<td>-0.1260959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People who make money through capital gains contribute less to the society than people make money through labor.  靠运作资金赚钱的人对社会的贡献比不上靠劳动赚钱的人。</td>
<td>afin</td>
<td>0.3010632</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Survey Questions</td>
<td>Coding</td>
<td>Mean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It is better to sell state-owned enterprises to capitalists than to let them go bankrupt.</td>
<td>priv</td>
<td>-0.3370889</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sectors related to national security and important to the national economy and people’s livelihoods must be controlled by state-owned enterprises.</td>
<td>nssoe</td>
<td>0.6869244</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The process of capital accumulation is always accompanied by harm to the working class.</td>
<td>acap</td>
<td>-0.2449739</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individuals should be able to own, buy and sell land.</td>
<td>lot</td>
<td>0.2216306</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign capital in China should enjoy the same treatment as national capital.</td>
<td>eqcap</td>
<td>-0.5624246</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural monopolies that emerge out of market competitions are harmless.</td>
<td>natmo</td>
<td>0.17414</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two adults should be free to engage in voluntary sexual behavior regardless of their marital status.</td>
<td>sex</td>
<td>-0.032542</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One should not openly comment on the shortcomings of their elders.</td>
<td>rel</td>
<td>0.0668434</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The modern Chinese society needs Confucianism.</td>
<td>confu</td>
<td>-0.6831901</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Even with population pressures, the state and the society have no right to interfere in the decision to have a child, or how many children to have.</td>
<td>fampl</td>
<td>-0.6464595</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The perspective of traditional Chinese medicine on human health is superior to that of modern mainstream medical science.</td>
<td>chimed</td>
<td>0.3126912</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It is unnecessary to push forward the simplification of Chinese characters.</td>
<td>simchi</td>
<td>-0.6052198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traditional Chinese classics should be the basic education material for children.</td>
<td>tradlit</td>
<td>0.1635781</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I will recognize the relationship between my child and a homosexual partner if it is a voluntary choice.</td>
<td>gay</td>
<td>0.1590108</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: response to each survey question coded as "Strongly Disagree" (-2), "Disagree" (-1), "Agree" (1), and "Strongly Agree" (2).
Appendix 3: Experiment Instrument:

AHPE Survey in both languages
Consent Form

Q1 Welcome to the research study! Consent for Participation in a Research Study

Study Title: Attitudes and preferences in social, economic, and foreign policy issues
Principal Investigator: Charles Lipson  
Student Researcher: Xunchao Zhang
IRB Study Number: IRB protocol number (17-0829)

DESCRIPTION: We are researchers at the University of Chicago doing a research study about Attitudes and preference on social, economic, and foreign policy issues. The survey is open to all Chinese citizens. Subjects participates in this study by responding to a list of survey question online. Participation should take about 10 minutes.

RISKS and BENEFITS: The risks to your participation in this online study are those associated with basic computer tasks, including boredom, fatigue, mild stress, or breach of confidentiality. The only benefit to you is the learning experience from participating in a research study. The benefit to society is the contribution to scientific knowledge.

COMPENSATION: No monetary incentive or compensation is provided. CONFIDENTIALITY: Other than demographic characteristics including year of born, approximate level of education and income, your personal information will not be stored with the research data we collect from you. We will not be accessing any personally identifying information about you that you. Any reports and presentations about the findings from this study will not include your name or any other information that could identify you. We may share the data we collect in this study with other researchers doing future studies – if we share your data, we will not contain information that could identify you.

SUBJECT'S RIGHTS: Your participation is voluntary. You may stop participating at any time by closing the browser window or the program to withdraw from the study. Partial data will not be analyzed. For additional questions about this research, you may contact: • Xunchao Zhang

For questions about your rights as a research participant, you may contact: xunchaoph@uchicago.edu  • The Social & Behavioral Sciences Institutional Review Board, University of Chicago Phone: (773) 834-7835; E-mail: sbs-irb@uchicago.edu

Please indicate, in the box below, that you are at least 18 years old, have read and understood this consent form, and you agree to participate in this online research study.

[欢迎参加本次研究自愿研究参与同意书 研究标题: 社会,经济和外交问题取向问卷 主要研究者: 查尔斯·李普森 Charles Lipson 学生研究者: 张洵超 Xunchao Zhang 机构审查委员会序列，协议号: IRB protocol number (17-0829) 研究概述: 我们是芝加哥大学从事社会, 经济, 和外交政策偏好问题的研究者。该问卷向所有中国公民开放。本次研究的参与者通过回答一系列问题参与研究。问卷大约需要 10 分钟完成。风险与益处: 您参与的潜在风险与计算机的日常使用相关; 您可能会感到无聊, 疲倦, 轻微的压力, 或者潜在的问卷信息外流。唯一的益处是参与问卷研究本身的学习经历。本次研究通过科学知识的贡献]
造益社会。报酬: 本次研究不提供物质报酬隐私: 除了出身年份、教育程度、和大致收入概况等基本人口特征，本次实验不会采集或储存个人信息。研究的参与是匿名的，我们不会采集任何个人识别信息。任何对研究结果的研究报告和展示不会包括您的名字，或者任何其他可以用于识别您的信息。为了推动未来的研究，我们可能与其他研究者分享不包含任何个人信息的研究数据。

研究参与者的权利: 您的参与是完全基于自愿的。您可以在任何时候关闭浏览器，中止，退出研究。如果您一旦退出，您的回答数据将不会被储存。

关于本次研究的额外问题请联系 张洵超
关于您作为研究参与者的权利请联系: xunchaozhang@uchicago.edu
社会和行为科学机构审查委员会, 芝加哥大学 电话: +1 (773) 834-7835; 电子邮件: sbs-irb@uchicago.edu

以下，请确认您年龄在 18 岁以上，您阅读并理解以上同意书，您愿意参与本次网上研究。

- 我的年龄在 18 岁以上，我阅读并理解了以上同意书，并愿意参与本次网上研究。I am 18 years of age or older and I consent to participate (1)
- 我不愿意参与本次网上研究。I do not consent, I do not wish to participate (2)

Q3 Human rights take precedence over sovereignty. 人权高于主权。
- 强烈不同意 Strongly Disagree (1)
- 不同意 agree (2)
- 同意 agree (3)
- 强烈同意 agree strongly (4)

Q4 When events that have major repercussions for the safety and security of people occur, the government should freely disseminate information even if information disclosure increases the risks of unrest. 发生重大社会安全事件时，即使认为信息公开会导致骚乱的风险，政府仍应该开放信息传播。
- 强烈不同意 Strongly Disagree (1)
- 不同意 agree (2)
- 同意 agree (3)
- 强烈同意 agree strongly (4)
Q5 Religious leaders and adherents should be allowed to conduct missionary work in nonreligious spaces. 应该容许宗教人士在非宗教场所公开传教。
- 强烈不同意 Strongly Disagree (1)
- 不同意 agree (2)
- 同意 agree (3)
- 强烈同意 agree strongly (4)

Q6 It is acceptable to besmirch the images of national leaders and founding leaders in literary and artistic works. 国家领导人及开国领袖的形象可以作为文艺作品的丑化对象。
- 强烈不同意 Strongly Disagree (1)
- 不同意 agree (2)
- 同意 agree (3)
- 强烈同意 agree strongly (4)

Q7 Lawyers should do their utmost to defend clients even if the client has committed a crime. 律师即使明知被辩护人的犯罪事实也应当尽力为其进行辩护。
- 强烈不同意 Strongly Disagree (1)
- 不同意 agree (2)
- 同意 agree (3)
- 强烈同意 agree strongly (4)

Q8 The state should take measures to train and support athletes so they can win glory for the country in various international competitions. 国家应当采取措施培养和支持体育健儿在各种国际比赛场合为国争光。
- 强烈不同意 Strongly Disagree (1)
- 不同意 agree (2)
- 同意 agree (3)
- 强烈同意 agree strongly (4)

Q58 A high tariff should be imposed on imported goods that are also produced domestically to protect national industries. 应当对国外同类产品征收高额关税来保护国内民族工业。
- 强烈不同意 Strongly Disagree (1)
- 不同意 agree (2)
- 同意 agree (3)
- 强烈同意 agree strongly (4)
Q59 When i see the national flag flies, I cannot help but feel a sense of pride in being a Chinese. 每到看到国旗风扬，作为中国人的自豪感油然而生。
- 强烈不同意 Strongly Disagree (1)
- 不同意 agree (2)
- 同意 agree (3)
- 强烈同意 agree strongly (4)

Q9 The minimum wage should be set by the state. 最低工资应由国家规定。
- 强烈不同意 Strongly Disagree (1)
- 不同意 agree (2)
- 同意 agree (3)
- 强烈同意 agree strongly (4)

Q10 The fruits of China's economic development since reform and opening up are enjoyed by a small group of people; most people have not received much benefit. 中国改革开放以来的经济发展的成果都被一小群人占有了，大多数人没得到什么好处。
- 强烈不同意 Strongly Disagree (1)
- 不同意 agree (2)
- 同意 agree (3)
- 强烈同意 agree strongly (4)

Q11 In the decision-making of major (infrastructure) projects, individual interests should give way to social interests. 在重大工程项目的决策中，个人利益应该为社会利益让路。
- 强烈不同意 Strongly Disagree (1)
- 不同意 agree (2)
- 同意 agree (3)
- 强烈同意 agree strongly (4)

Q12 High-income earners should disclose the source of their income. 高收入者应该公开自己的经济来源。
- 强烈不同意 Strongly Disagree (1)
- 不同意 agree (2)
- 同意 agree (3)
- 强烈同意 agree strongly (4)
Q14 Education should be public to the greatest extent. 教育应当尽可能公立。
- 强烈不同意 Strongly Disagree (1)
- 不同意 agree (2)
- 同意 agree (3)
- 强烈同意 agree strongly (4)

Q15 Attempting to control real estate prices will undermine economic development. 试图控制房地产价格的行为会破坏经济发展。
- 强烈不同意 Strongly Disagree (1)
- 不同意 agree (2)
- 同意 agree (3)
- 强烈同意 agree strongly (4)

Q16 The primary means to improve the lives of the low-income people is to give them fiscal subsidies and support. 改善低收入者生活的首要手段是国家给予财政补贴和扶持。
- 强烈不同意 Strongly Disagree (1)
- 不同意 agree (2)
- 同意 agree (3)
- 强烈同意 agree strongly (4)

Q17 Rich people deserve better medical services. 有钱人理应获得更好的医疗服务。
- 强烈不同意 Strongly Disagree (1)
- 不同意 agree (2)
- 同意 agree (3)
- 强烈同意 agree strongly (4)

Q19 People who make money through capital gains contribute less to the society than people make money through labor. 靠运作资金赚钱的人对社会的贡献比不上靠劳动赚钱的人。
- 强烈不同意 Strongly Disagree (1)
- 不同意 agree (2)
- 同意 agree (3)
- 强烈同意 agree strongly (4)
Q20 It is better to sell state-owned enterprises to capitalists than to let them go bankrupt.
与其让国有企业亏损破产，不如转卖给资本家。
- 强烈不同意 Strongly Disagree (1)
- 不同意 agree (2)
- 同意 agree (3)
- 强烈同意 agree strongly (4)

Q21 Sectors related to national security and important to the national economy and people's livelihoods must be controlled by state-owned enterprises.
那些关系到国家安全、以及其他重要国计民生的领域，必须全部由国有企业掌控。
- 强烈不同意 Strongly Disagree (1)
- 不同意 agree (2)
- 同意 agree (3)
- 强烈同意 agree strongly (4)

Q22 The process of capital accumulation is always accompanied by harm to the working class.
资本积累的过程总是伴随着对普通劳动人民利益的伤害。
- 强烈不同意 Strongly Disagree (1)
- 不同意 agree (2)
- 同意 agree (3)
- 强烈同意 agree strongly (4)

Q23 Individuals should be able to own, buy and sell land.
私人应当可以拥有和买卖土地。
- 强烈不同意 Strongly Disagree (1)
- 不同意 agree (2)
- 同意 agree (3)
- 强烈同意 agree strongly (4)

Q25 Natural monopolies that emerge out of market competitions are harmless.
市场竞争中自然形成的垄断地位是无害的。
- 强烈不同意 Strongly Disagree (1)
- 不同意 agree (2)
- 同意 agree (3)
- 强烈同意 agree strongly (4)
Q26 Two adults should be free to engage in voluntary sexual behavior regardless of their marital status. 两个成年人之间自愿的性行为是其自由，无论其婚姻关系为何。
- 强烈不同意 Strongly Disagree (1)
- 不同意 agree (2)
- 同意 agree (3)
- 强烈同意 agree strongly (4)

Q28 The modern Chinese society needs Confucianism. 现代中国社会需要儒家思想。
- 强烈不同意 Strongly Disagree (1)
- 不同意 agree (2)
- 同意 agree (3)
- 强烈同意 agree strongly (4)

Q29 Foreign capital in China should enjoy the same treatment as national capital. 在华外国资本应享受和民族资本同样的待遇。
- 强烈不同意 Strongly Disagree (1)
- 不同意 agree (2)
- 同意 agree (3)
- 强烈同意 agree strongly (4)

Q30 Even with population pressures, the state and the society have no right to interfere in the decision to have a child, or how many children to have. 即使有人口压力，国家和社会也无权干涉个人要不要孩子，要几个孩子。
- 强烈不同意 Strongly Disagree (1)
- 不同意 agree (2)
- 同意 agree (3)
- 强烈同意 agree strongly (4)

Q31 The perspective of traditional Chinese medicine on human health is superior to that of modern mainstream medical science. 中国传统医学对人体健康的观念比现代主流医学更高明。
- 强烈不同意 Strongly Disagree (1)
- 不同意 agree (2)
- 同意 agree (3)
- 强烈同意 agree strongly (4)
Q32 It is unnecessary to push forward the simplification of Chinese characters. 汉字无需人为推行简化。
- 强烈不同意 Strongly Disagree (1)
- 不同意 agree (2)
- 同意 agree (3)
- 强烈同意 agree strongly (4)

Q33 Traditional Chinese classics should be the basic education material for children. 应当将中国传统文化的经典作品作为儿童基础教育读物。
- 强烈不同意 Strongly Disagree (1)
- 不同意 agree (2)
- 同意 agree (3)
- 强烈同意 agree strongly (4)

Q34 I will recognize the relationship between my child and a homosexual partner if it is a voluntary choice. 如果是出于自愿，我会认可我的孩子和同性结成伴侣关系。
- 强烈不同意 Strongly Disagree (1)
- 不同意 agree (2)
- 同意 agree (3)
- 强烈同意 agree strongly (4)

Q35 If the price of pork is too high, the government should intervene. 如果猪肉价格过高，政府应当干预。
- 强烈不同意 Strongly Disagree (1)
- 不同意 agree (2)
- 同意 agree (3)
- 强烈同意 agree strongly (4)

Q37 Indiscriminately imitating (systems of) western-style freedom of speech will lead to social disorder in China. 在中国照搬西方式的言论自由会导致社会失序。
- 强烈不同意 Strongly Disagree (1)
- 不同意 agree (2)
- 同意 agree (3)
- 强烈同意 agree strongly (4)
Q38 Even if procedural rules are violated in the process of investigation and evidence gathering, those who have committed crimes should be punished. 哪怕经历了违反程序规定的审讯和取证过程，确实有罪的犯罪也应被处刑。
- 强烈不同意 Strongly Disagree (1)
- 不同意 agree (2)
- 同意 agree (3)
- 强烈同意 agree strongly (4)

Q39 Western multiparty systems are unsuitable for China. 西方的多党制不适合中国国情。
- 强烈不同意 Strongly Disagree (1)
- 不同意 agree (2)
- 同意 agree (3)
- 强烈同意 agree strongly (4)

Q64 Good government depends on government tutelage and management of the public, rather than elections. 良好政府的基础是政府对公众的监护和管理，而不是选举。
- 强烈不同意 Strongly Disagree (1)
- 不同意 agree (2)
- 同意 agree (3)
- 强烈同意 agree strongly (4)

Q41 Primary school, secondary school, and college students should all participate in government organized military training. 无论中小学生或大学生，都应参加由国家统一安排的军训。
- 强烈不同意 Strongly Disagree (1)
- 不同意 agree (2)
- 同意 agree (3)
- 强烈同意 agree strongly (4)

Q42 Timing
First Click (1)
Last Click (2)
Page Submit (3)
Click Count (4)
Q43 Please look and this map carefully, and click on your current location, and answer the next question. 请认真看这一地图，点击您所在的大致位置，然后答下一题

Q44 Here is a map. The green dots indicates cities that participated in the 2016 national basketball championship. Do you or your family live in one of those cities? 绿点所标出的是派队参加 2016 年全国篮球联赛的的城市，您或者您的家人是否生活在其中某一个城市？

- Yes (1)
- No (2)

Q45 Timing
First Click (1)
Last Click (2)
Page Submit (3)
Click Count (4)
Q46 Please look and this map carefully, and click on your current location, and answer the next question 请认真看这一地图，点击您所在的大致位置，然后答下下一题

Q47 Here is a map. The green dots indicates cities that are on a declassified US nuclear weapon target list. Do you or your family live in one of those cities? 绿点所标出的是一份解密美国国家安全委员会文件中，美国核武器打击目标城市，您或者您的家人是否生活在其中某一个城市？
- Yes (1)
- No (2)

Q48 Timing
- First Click (1)
- Last Click (2)
- Page Submit (3)
- Click Count (4)
Q49 It is impossible for Western countries led by the United States to tolerate the rise of China into a major power. 以美国为首的西方国家不可能真正容许中国崛起成为一流强国。

- 强烈不同意 Strongly Disagree (1)
- 不同意 agree (2)
- 同意 agree (3)
- 强烈同意 agree strongly (4)

Q27 One should not openly comment on the shortcomings of their elders. 不应公开谈论自己领导的缺点。

- 不同意 (1)
- 同意 Agree (2)

Q36 Which one is more important for a child to have? curiosity or good manners 在教育孩子的过程中，培养孩子的服从好奇心和礼貌更重要？

- 好奇心 curiosity (1)
- 礼貌 good manner (2)

Q62 Which one is more important for a child to have? independence or respect for elders 在教育孩子的过程中哪种品质更重要，培养孩子的独立性还是对长辈的尊重？

- 独立性 (1)
- 尊重长辈 respect for elders (2)

Q18 Which one is more important for a child to have? obedience and discipline or independent thinking? 在教育孩子过程中，培养孩子的服从纪律性和独立性思考哪种品质更重要？

- 独立思考 independent thinking (1)
- 服从和纪律性 obedience and discipline (2)

Q50 Force should be used to reunify Taiwan with China if conditions permit. 条件允许的话应该武力统一台湾。

- 强烈不同意 Strongly Disagree (1)
- 不同意 agree (2)
- 同意 agree (3)
- 强烈同意 agree strongly (4)
Q51 The United States poses a military threat to China 美国是对中国军事威胁
- 强烈不同意 Strongly Disagree (1)
- 不同意 agree (2)
- 同意 agree (3)
- 强烈同意 agree strongly (4)

Q58 China should increase military deployment in the South China Sea 中国应该增加在南海的军事部署
- 强烈不同意 Strongly Disagree (1)
- 不同意 agree (2)
- 同意 agree (3)
- 强烈同意 agree strongly (4)

Q52 Timing
- First Click (1)
- Last Click (2)
- Page Submit (3)
- Click Count (4)

Q53 您的出生年份大致是 What is your year of birth?
- 1970-1979 (1)
- 1980-1989 (2)
- 1990-1999 (3)
- After 2000 (4)

Q54 What is the highest level of school you have completed or the highest degree you have received?
- 高中及以下 High school and less (1)
- 本科，学士 Bachelor degrees (2)
- 硕士及以上 Graduate School and Above (3)

Q55 What is your sex? 您的性别
- Man 男 (0)
- Female 女 (1)
Q56 Information about income is very important to understand. Would you please give your best guess? Please indicate the answer that includes your entire household income in (previous year) before taxes.

- Less than 低于 ¥10,000 (1)
- ¥10,000 - ¥30,000 (2)
- ¥30,000 - ¥50,000 (3)
- ¥50,000 - ¥80,000 (4)
- ¥80,000 - ¥150,000 (5)
- ¥150,000 - ¥300,000 (6)
- ¥300,000 - ¥500,000 (7)
- More than ¥500,000 (8)